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Abstract 
This paper studies how changes in factor endowment, technology, and trade costs jointly determine 
the structural adjustments, which are defined as changes in distributions of production and exports. 
We document the structural adjustments in Chinese manufacturing firms from 1999 to 2007 and find 
that production became more capital-intensive while exports did not. We structurally estimate a 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms to explain this seemingly puzzling 
pattern. Counterfactual simulations show that capital deepening made Chinese production more 
capital-intensive, but technology changes that biased toward the labor-intensive sectors and trade 
liberalizations provided a counterbalancing force. 
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1 Introduction
We define structural adjustments as changes in the distribution of production and exports. In
a world of multiple industries, economic structure evolves constantly. One familiar economic
development pattern is that a country will first produce labor-intensive goods. Then, those in-
dustries decline and are gradually replaced with more capital-intensive industries. According to
the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory, as a country becomes more capital abundant, production and
exports will become more capital-intensive. Yet the effects of trade liberalization and changes
in Ricardian comparative advantage on structural adjustments have not been sufficiently inves-
tigated. Existing analysis in the literature focuses on adjustment across industries, like Romalis
(2004), but largely ignores the effect of reallocation within industries across heterogeneous
firms (Melitz, 2003). In this paper, we provide empirical, theoretical, and quantitative evidence
on how changes in factor endowment, technology, and trade costs jointly determine structural
adjustments both across and within sectors.
The first contribution of this paper is to document three seemingly puzzling facts on struc-
tural adjustments in China from 1999 to 2007. As one of the fastest-growing economies, China
provides a good case for studying structural adjustments. Using firm-level data for the period
1999-2007, we find the following: 1) Manufacturing production became more capital-intensive
in 2007 as compared with 1999. As China was clearly more capital abundant in 2007 than in
1999, according to classical HO theory, China should be producing and exporting more capital-
intensive goods. Thus, the observed adjustment in the structure of production is consistent with
classical HO theory. 2) Exports did not become more capital-intensive. Instead, the percent-
age of exporters and export intensity increased in labor-intensive industries and decreased in
capital-intensive industries. This fact is at odds with HO theory (Romalis, 2004).1 3) Produc-
tivity in labor-intensive industries grew faster than those in capital-intensive industries during
the period 1999-2007.2
The second contribution of this paper is to develop a unified theoretical model to study struc-
tural adjustments, especially the puzzling patterns in China. We introduce firm heterogeneity
1The failure of HO theory to pass empirical tests was first pointed out by Leontief (1953). For a synthesis of
the literature, see Feenstra (2015).
2Work by Trefler (1993, 1995), Harrigan (1995, 1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001) point at the importance of
recognizing cross country technology differences when we examine the prediction of HO theory.
2
(Melitz, 2003) into the two-country continuous HO and Ricardian framework (Dornbusch, Fis-
cher, and Samuelson 1977, 1980, hereafter DFS).3 In our model, countries differ in endowment
and technology, and we posit a continuum of industries with differing levels of capital intensity.
An industry is made up of heterogeneous firms facing idiosyncratic productivity shock as in
Melitz (2003). Two cut-off industries define most labor-intensive industries, intermediate labor
(or capital) intensive industries, and most capital-intensive industries, and therefore determine
the pattern of production and trade specialization between two countries. The labor (capital)
abundant country completely specializes in most labor (capital) industries. Both countries pro-
duce in intermediate labor-intensive industries. Trade is one-way for industries in which either
country completely specializes and two-way in industries in which both countries produce.4 We
show that export participation, measured by the conditional probability of exporting, and export
intensity, measured by the fraction of sales exported in each industry, are higher in industries
with stronger comparative advantage.
We numerically solve the model to conduct comparative statics. Three main model proper-
ties are: 1) We confirm the “quasi-Rybczynski”theorem by Romalis (2004), which states that
production and exports become more capital-intensive when a country becomes more capital
abundant. Furthermore, the magnitude of changes is more pronounced in more capital-intensive
industries. Export participation and export intensity increase in capital-intensive industries and
decrease in labor-intensive industries. 2) Sector-biased technology changes that strengthen the
Ricardian comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries increase export participation and
export intensity in these industries and shift production toward them. The first two properties
can be thought of as the single crossing property for sectoral distribution of production and
exports. 3) Trade liberalization magnifies existing comparative advantages. The labor-abundant
country will produce and export more in labor-intensive industries when trade costs are reduced.
The third contribution of this paper is to quantify the driving forces behind structural adjust-
ments in China. Using the method of moments, we estimate the model’s underlining parameters
on endowment, technology, and trade costs for China during the period of 1999-2007. This
3Existing theories of international trade mostly study comparative advantages due to factor endowment or
technology, alone. Chor (2010) and Marrow (2010) are among the few exceptions. Furthermore, there is little
theoretical predictions when more than two sectors are considered.
4Unlike Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), zeros in trade flow can be generated in our model even though
productivity distribution is unbounded. This is possible since entry is endogenous and countries can specialize in
production.
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quantitative analysis allows us to gauge the contribution of each driving force by conducting
counterfactual experiments while considering general equilibrium effects. Our estimation re-
sults indicate that during the period of 1999-2007 the capital-to-labor ratio of China more than
doubled, technology improved significantly and favored labor-intensive industries, and trade
liberalization reduced variable trade costs by more than a quarter. By running counterfactual
simulations that replace the model parameters of 1999 with the parameters of 2007, we find
that factor endowment was the major force shifting Chinese production to capital-intensive in-
dustries. Changes in parameters governing trading costs and technology contributed much less
to the adjustments in production patterns. At the same time, sector-biased technology change
was the main driving force behind the adjustments in exports. Over time, China gained more
Ricardian comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries due to faster productivity growth
in these industries. Such technology changes induced more firms to select into exporting and
endogenously amplified the Ricardian comparative advantage in labor industries, outweigh-
ing forces from endowment changes and leading to more exports in labor-intensive industries.
Hence, the quantitative analysis helps to account for the empirical facts on the structural adjust-
ments in China.
Our estimated model also allows us to separate the endogenous Ricardian comparative ad-
vantage from the ex-ante Ricardian comparative advantage (Bernard, Redding, and Schott,
2007a) and to evaluate the contribution of export selection to sectoral productivity growth
(Melitz, 2003). We find that export selection strongly shapes Ricardian comparative advan-
tage and contributes 2.1% of overall productivity growth. We also evaluate welfare gains for
China and the rest of the world (RoW) due to structural adjustments and find that although both
China and RoW benefit from China’s structural adjustments, China benefits relatively more.
The rise of China relative to RoW is mostly driven by technology changes, less by endowment,
and least by trade liberalization. This is consistent with the survey by Zhu (2012) in which he
concludes that productivity growth is the main source of growth for China.5
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, we embrace the key insights from
Trefler (1993, 1995), Harrigan (1995, 1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Chor (2010) and
5Our result is also consistent with Tombe and Zhu (2015) in which they find trade liberalization contributes
modestly to the growth of China. That being said, we only capture the aggregate reallocation effects but not the
within-firm changes. De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) provide an in-depth review of the various channels that
trade liberalization affects productivity through within-firm changes.
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Morrow (2010) by incorporating cross-country and sectoral productivity differences into the
HO model. We extend their analysis to allow for firm heterogeneity and reallocation within
industries. Moreover, we structurally estimate model primitives to quantify the relative con-
tribution of changes in endowment and technology to structural adjustments. Compared with
analysis based on multivariate regressions, our study enables richer analysis via counterfactual
simulations.6
We also contribute to the literature studying the interaction of firm heterogeneity and com-
parative advantage, most notably Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007a). Recent contributions
include Okubo (2009), Lu (2010), Fan et al. (2011), and Burstein and Vogel (2011, 2016). With
the exception of Burstein and Vogel (2011, 2016), these papers include either HO or Ricardian
comparative advantage alone. Whereas the focus of Burstein and Vogel (2011, 2016) is on the
effect of trade liberalization on skill premium, we focus on structural adjustments. Moreover,
our paper is the first to quantify endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage, a mechanism
found in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007a).
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies the effect of evolving comparative
advantage. Redding (2002) studies the role of technology and endowment in the evolution of
specialization patterns. Like his study, we also analyze how the distribution of economic ac-
tivity across sectors changes over time. Romalis (2004) uses long-run data and finds evidence
supporting the Rybczynski effect. Costinot et al. (2016), Levchenko and Zhang (2016) exam-
ine the welfare implications of evolving comparative advantage. We focus on how evolving
comparative advantage shapes structures of production and exports, taking into account firm
heterogeneity and changes in trade costs.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature studying China’s trade growth and its implica-
tions for RoW. Rodrik (2006), Schott (2008), and Wang and Wei (2010) discovered that Chinese
exports were getting more sophisticated. Despite that, Amiti and Freund (2010) find that the
labor intensity of Chinese exports remains unchanged when processing trade is accounted for.
Thus, China continues to specialize in labor-intensive industries, which is consistent with our
6Structural approach is increasing popular in the field of international trade, especially since the seminal contri-
bution by Eaton and Kortum (2002) which provides a tractable multi-country Ricardian model. Recent applications
include Chor (2010), Costinot et al (2016) and Donaldson (forthcoming). We instead follow the two-country DFS
set-up which is also seen in Gaubert and Itskhoki (2015). Different from us, they focus on the granularity of firms
and its implication for comparative advantage.
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findings. We show that this is possible in a more and more capital-abundant country because
trade liberalization and sector-bias technology favor exports from labor-intensive industries.
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) find negative effects of Chinese import competition on US
local employment and have ignited vibrant research evaluating welfare gains from trading with
China. Hsieh and Ossa (2011), and di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang (2014) both study the
welfare effect of productivity growth in China. We include changes in endowment and trade
liberalization and quantify the welfare effect of each channel individually.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data patterns
we observed from Chinese firm-level data. Section 3 develops the model, and our equilibrium
analysis is presented in section 4. Section 5 provides numerical solutions for the model and
conducts several numerical comparative statics. Section 6 structurally estimates the model and
presents the quantitative results, including the counterfactual experiments and welfare analysis.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
Structural adjustments take place in all economies gradually but surely as sector distribution
evolves. In this section, we document stylized facts about adjustments in production and trade
structure over time. We focus on China because of its fast economic development and the
availability of good firm-level data. We use data from the Chinese Annual Industrial Survey for
the period 1999-2007 that covers all State Owned Enterprise (SOE) and non-SOEs with annual
sales higher than 5 million RMB Yuan.7 The dataset provides information on balance sheet,
profit and loss, cash flow statements, firm identification, ownership, exports, employment, etc.
We focus on manufacturing firms and exclude utility and mining firms. To clean the data, we
follow Brandt et al. (2012), dropping firms with missing, zero, or negative capital stock, exports
or value added, and only include firms with more than eight employees. Summary statistics of
the basic variables after cleaning are shown in the Appendix Table A.1.
Guided by HO theory, we focus on sectors that have different capital intensities. We define
capital intensity as 1− wagevalue added .8 Since the focus of this paper is on changes in sectoral
7We do not look at years after 2007 due to the lack of data. The aftermath of the financial crisis is also of great
concern.
8We drop firms with capital intensity larger than one or less than zero. Wage is defined as the sum of payable
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distribution over time, we mostly compare the data from 1999 to that from 2007.
Table 1 presents the basic empirical features of Chinese manufacturing firms in terms of
factor allocation and export participation. The average capital share of manufacturing firms in-
creased by four percentage points.9 So overall manufacture production is more capital-intensive
in 2007 than in 1999. At the same time, the average capital share of exporters stays almost un-
changed. The fraction of exporting firms remained at around 25%. The share of goods exported
increased by about three percentage points, from 18% to 21%.
Table 1: Capital Share and Export Participation
Variables mean in 1999 mean in 2007
capital share of all manufacturers 0.667 0.707
capital share of exporters 0.623 0.619
proportion of exporters 0.253 0.249
exports/gross sales 0.181 0.208
2.1 Definition of Industry
To study structural adjustments, we need to measure the industrial distribution of production
and exports. However, conventional sector classification potentially fails to appropriately group
products. As Schott (2003, page 687) argues, ”testing the key insight of Heckscher-Olin the-
ory ... requires grouping together products that are both close substitutes and manufactured
with identical techniques. Traditional aggregates can fail on both counts.” Table A.2 in the
Appendix shows that there are large variations of capital share within the two-digit Chinese
Industry Classification (CIC) of industries in 2007. The standard deviation of capital intensity
across firms within each industry is around 0.22. Moreover, the capital intensity between ex-
porters and non-exporters differs significantly. Except for Manufacture of Tobacco (industry
16), the capital share of exporters is significantly lower than non-exporters. These differences
wage, labor and employment insurance fee, and total employee benefits payable. The 2007 data also reports hous-
ing fund and housing subsidy, endowment insurance and medical insurance, and employee educational expenses
provided by the employers. Adding these three variables increase the average labor share slightly. To make it
consistent, we do not include them.
9Hsieh and Klenow (2009) point out that labor share generated out of the firm level survey is significantly less
than the numbers reported in the Chinese input-output tables and the national accounts (roughly 50%). They argue
that it can be explained by non-wage compensation. But even in the aggregate numbers, capital share is increasing
over time, as documented by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Chang, Chen, Waggoner and Zha (2015).
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persist even when we use the four-digit CIC industry classification, which includes more than
400 industries.10
Given the large variation of capital intensity within each industry and the systematic dif-
ferences between exporters and non-exporters, we follow Schott’s idea to define industry as
”HO aggregate” and regroup firms according to their capital intensity. For example, firms with
capital share from 0 to 0.01 are lumped together and defined as industry 1, for a total of 100
industries.11
2.2 Production
We first examine how Chinese production structure changes over time. Panel (a) in Figure 1
plots the distribution of production across ”industries”. Each dot on the left panel represents
the share of firms operating in each industry defined according to capital intensity. The share
of firms producing in capital-intensive industries increases over time as the whole distribution
shifts to the right in 2007. Thus, there is significant reallocation of resources to capital-intensive
industries. Panel (b) plots the distribution of outputs in terms of the real value added at industry
level. Firms in capital-intensive industries accounted for larger fractions in 2007 than in 1999.12
Table 2 summarizes the information in Figure 1, comparing capital-intensive industries in which
firms’ capital intensities are higher than 0.5 with other industries. As the first column indicates,
the share of capital-intensive firms increased by 5.3 percentage points, from 76.5% in 1999
to 81.8% in 2007. Those firms’ employment and output shares also increased by 9.0 and 6.0
percentage points, respectively, as shown in the last two columns.
Stylized fact 1: The Chinese manufacturing production became more capital intensive over
time.
10For brevity, the results are not reported but available upon request. Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005) and Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2007b) found that exporters are more capital intensive than non-exporters for Chilean and
American firms, respectively. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007b) speculated that exporters in developing coun-
tries should be more labor intensive than non-exporters given their comparative advantage in labor intensive goods.
For the same data, Ma et al.(2014) use capital labor ratio (capital divided by wage payments) as the indicator of
factor intensity. They also find Chinese exporters are less capital intensive than non-exporters.
11Such an industry definition has also been used by Ju, Lin and Wang (2015) to study industry dynamics.
12Real value added is calculated using the input and output pricing index constructed by Brandt et al (2012).
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Table 2: Structural Adjustment of Production
Year
share of firms in
capital intensive industries
share of employment in
capital intensive industries
share of value added by
capital intensive industries
1999 0.765 0.672 0.879
2007 0.818 0.762 0.938
Difference 0.053 0.090 0.059
Notes: Capital intensive industries are industries with capital intensity larger than 0.5. The row ”Difference”
is the difference between year 1999 and 2007.
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Figure 1: Distribution of outputs
2.3 Trade Patterns
Next, we examine China’s structure of exports. Figure 2 plots the distribution of exports across
industries. The left panel plots the distribution of exporters (defined by the ratio of number of
exporters in the industry to total number of exporters) in 1999 and 2007, and shows that the
distribution stays almost unchanged.13 The right panel plots the distribution of export sales
(defined by the ratio of the export sales in the industry to total export sales), and we can see that
distribution patterns for the two years are almost indistinguishable. So, there is no noticeable
change in aggregate exports. This result is at odds with the Rybczynski theorem that predicts
that a country’s production and exports will become more capital-intensive when the country
becomes more capital abundant. At the same time we find that export participation for different
industries changes over time. Figure 3 plots export participation within each industry. The
left panel plots the share of exporters for each industry (defined by the ratio of number of
13If anything, it shifts towards the labor intensive industries.
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exporters to total number of firms in the industry), and we can see that over time it increases in
labor-intensive industries and drops in capital-intensive industries. The right panel plots export
intensity, which is the value of exports divided by total sales for each industry. It increases for
most industries, especially labor-intensive industries. However, it drops for the more capital-
intensive industries.
These adjustments are also shown in Table 3. As the first column indicates, the fraction
of capital-intensive exporters dropped by 0.5% during the period 1999-2007. These exporters
contributed to 81.4% of total exports in 1999. The fraction of export sales by capital-intensive
industries dropped by 0.3%, to 81.1% in 2007, as shown in the second column. Finally, accord-
ing to the third column, in capital intensive industries, 23.4% of firms were exporters in 1999,
while that fraction dropped to 21.4% in 2007.
Stylized fact 2: The average capital intensity of Chinese exports stayed almost unchanged over
time. Export participation increased in labor-intensive industries and decreased in capital-
intensive industries.
Table 3: Structural Adjustment of Exports
Year
fraction of exporters from
capital intensive industries
fraction of export sales by
capital intensive industries
share of exporting firms in
capital intensive industries
1999 0.708 0.814 0.234
2007 0.703 0.811 0.214
Difference -0.005 -0.003 -0.020
Notes: Capital intensive industries are industries with capital intensity larger than 0.5. The row ”Difference”
is the difference between year 1999 and 2007.
Putting Stylized facts 1 and 2 together, we have a seemingly puzzling observation. Produc-
tion clearly became more capital-intensive in 2007 than in 1999, while exports did not.14 Ac-
cording to the standard HO theory, one should expect exports to become more capital-intensive
when production becomes more capital-intensive. However, the HO theory assumes away the
role of productivity. This leads us to the next stylized fact.
14This does not contradict earlier work on the rising sophistication of Chinese exports (Rodrik 2006, Schott
2008, Wang and Wei 2010). China might have exported more sophisticated products but only engaged in the
labor intensive assembling. As found by Amiti and Freund (2010), the labor intensity of Chinese exports remain
unchanged from 1992 to 2005 once processing trade is accounted for.
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Figure 2: Distribution of exports
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Industry
1999 2007
Exporter Share by Industry
(a)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Industry
1999 2007
Export Intensity by Industry
(b)
Figure 3: Export participation by industry
2.4 Productivity
We now look at productivity growth from 1999 to 2007 across industries, as in Trefler (1993,
1995), Harrigan (1995, 1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001), which point at the importance of
examining technology. First, we gather firm-level data over nine years to estimate the firm
level total factor productivity (TFP) using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.15 Then
15The panel is constructed using the method by Brandt et al (2012). Their price indexes and program to construct
the panel are available at http://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/China/. Real output is measured by real
value added. Real output and input are all constructed using the input and output price indexes provided by them.
Capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method. Labor is measured as employment. We estimate
the TFP by 2-digit CIC industries. For brevity, the estimate results are not reported here but available upon request.
Our results are robust to the Olley and Pakes (1996) method or labor productivity measured as real value added per
11
we compute the average TFP for each industry weighted by firm outputs, trimming the top
and bottom one percent to remove outliers. Figure 4 shows the estimated average TFP for each
industry. There are two basic observations. First, TFP rises from 1999 to 2007 for all industries.
Second, TFP grows faster in labor-intensive industries. In other words, productivity growth is
biased toward labor-intensive industries.
Stylized fact 3: Productivity grew faster in labor intensive industries.
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Figure 4: Total Factor Productivity
2.5 Robustness of the Stylized Facts
We explore the robustness of the stylized facts in this subsection. To show that the stylized facts
are robust using data from periods other than the years of 1999 and 2007, we use all the data and
look at the annual differences. The results are presented in Table 4. Our baseline specification
below studies how annual changes of outcome are systematically related to the capital intensity
of each industry.
∆Yit = αZi+βXit + εit
where ∆Yit is the change of industry outcome Y from period t-1 to t: ∆Yit =Yit−Yit−1, t=2000,2001,...,2007.
The outcomes include the share of firm number, output, sales, exporter number, export volume,
worker. This is shown in the Appendix 8.7.
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export intensity and average TFP. Zi is the capital intensity of sector i and Xit includes other
controls. Table 4 presents the baseline results. From column (1) to (3), we find that production
becomes capital-intensive over time as the share of firms, value added, and sales all increase
with capital intensity. However, the distribution of exports across industries does not really
move; the share of exporters and export volume basically are not correlated with capital inten-
sity at all, as shown in columns (4) and (5). Instead, changes in export propensity and export
intensity tend to be smaller for capital-intensive industries, which we can see in columns (6)
and (7). Finally, TFP growth tends to be lower in more capital-intensive industries as shown in
column (8).
Table 4: Structural Adjustments China 1999-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm # Value added Sales Exporter # Export Volume Export Propensity Export Intensity TFP
capital intensity 0.000623a 0.00105a 0.00107a -0.0000558 0.000238 -0.0276a -0.0382a -0.0530a
(0.0000866) (0.000356) (0.000310) (0.0000385) (0.000266) (0.00139) (0.00304) (0.00761)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.0734 0.0126 0.0142 0.000350 0.000201 0.272 0.0340 0.359
No. of observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Notes: The dependent variables of columns (1) to (5) are first-difference in the share of firm number, value
added, sales, exporter number and export volume for each industry, respectively. The dependent variable of
column (6) is the first-difference of export propensity (defined as the number of exporters divided by firm
number within each industry). The dependent variable of column (7) is the first-difference of export intensity
(defined as the value of exports divided by total sales within each industry). The dependent variable of column
(8) is the growth rate of average sectoral TFP weighted by value added. The estimation method is OLS. Robust
standard errors clustered at industry level are reported in the parentheses. The constants are absorbed by the
year fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated by a, b, c at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Another concern is whether the findings are driven purely by the ”HO aggregate”. In Ap-
pendix 8.7, we show that this is not the case. We use the four-digit CIC industry classification
to regenerate all facts. As is evident from the figures, our findings that a) Chinese production
became more capital-intensive but exports did not, b) export participation increased in labor-
intensive sectors but declined in capital-intensive sectors, and c) productivity growth is faster in
labor-intensive sectors, all hold under CIC industry classification.
Finally, to check whether our results are driven by any peculiar Chinese institution, we
regenerate the facts using various sub-samples. To address the concern of the expiration of
the Multi Fiber Agreement in 2005 and rising exports in the labor-intensive textile industries,
we exclude the corresponding two-digit CIC industry categories 17 and 18 as per Khandelwal,
Schott, and Wei (2013). To address the effect of reform of Chinese SOEs in the late 1990s,
which might favor certain industries over others, we exclude all SOEs from our sample. Finally,
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to address the effects of processing trade and export subsidies, we exclude all pure exporters
that are predominantly processing exporters and thus benefit from export subsidies.16 In these
various sub-samples, our basic findings are qualitatively preserved, as shown in Appendix 8.7.
3 Model Setup
To account for the empirical features of the data, we now build a model that incorporates Ri-
cardian comparative advantage, HO comparative advantage, and firm heterogeneity. The model
embeds heterogeneous firms (Melitz 2003) into a Ricardian and HO theory within a continuum
of industries (Dornbusch, Fisher, and Samuelson 1977, 1980). There are two countries: home
and foreign, which differ only in technology and factor endowment. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the home country is labor abundant, that is: L/K > L∗/K∗, and has Ricardian
comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries.17 There is a continuum of industries z on
the interval of [0,1]. z denotes the industry capital intensity, so that higher z stands for higher
capital intensity. Each industry is inhabited by heterogeneous firms which produce different
varieties of goods and sell in a market with monopolistic competition.
3.1 Demand Side
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households that can be aggregated into
a representative household. The representative household’s preference over different goods is
given by the following utility function:
U =
1∫
0
b(z) lnQ(z)dz,
where b(z) is the expenditure share on each industry and satisfies
1∫
0
b(z)dz = 1, and Q(z) is
the lower-tier utility function over the consumption of individual varieties qz(ω) given by the
16Pure exporters are defined as exporters with export intensity greater than 70% following Defever and Rian˜o
(2017).
17Variables with “*” are for the foreign. We will discuss what happens if HO and Ricardian comparative advan-
tage favor different industries.
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following CES aggregator:18
Q(z) = (
∫
ω∈Ωz
qz(ω)ρdω)1/ρ
where Ωz is the varieties available for industry z. We assume 0 < ρ ≤ 1 so that the elasticity of
substitution σ = 11−ρ > 1. The demand function for individual varieties is given by:
qz(ω) = Q(z)(
pz(ω)
P(z)
)−σ (3.1)
where P(z) = (
∫
ω∈Ωz
pz(ω)1−σdω)
1
1−σ is the dual price index defined over price of different
varieties pz(ω).
3.2 Production
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that production incurs a fixed cost during each period
which is the same for all firms in the same industry, and that variable cost varies with firm
productivity. Firm productivity A(z)ϕ has two components: A(z) is a common component for
all firms from the same industry z; ϕ is an idiosyncratic component drawn from a common
continuous and increasing distribution G(ϕ), with probability density function g(ϕ). Following
Romalis (2004) and Bernard et al. (2007a), we assume that fixed costs are paid using capital
and labor with a factor intensity that matches that of production in that industry. Specifically,
we assume that the total cost function is:
Γ(z,ϕ) =
(
fz+
q(z,ϕ)
A(z)ϕ
)
rzw1−z (3.2)
where r and w are rents for capital and labor respectively. The relative industry-specific produc-
tivity for home and foreign ε(z) is assumed to be:
ε(z)≡ A(z)
A∗(z)
= λAz,λ > 0, A > 0. (3.3)
18Such a preference structure is also used in the survey paper to quantify gains from trade by Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2014). In the Appendix 9.3, we generalize our main theoretical results to a nested-CES prefer-
ences structure.
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Under this assumption, λ captures the absolute advantage and A captures the comparative
advantage. Higher λ leads the home country to be relatively more productive in all industries.
If A > 1, the home country is relatively more productive in capital-intensive industries and has
Ricardian comparative advantages in those industries. If A = 1, ε(z) does not vary with z, and
there is no role for Ricardian comparative advantage. Under the assumption that home has
Ricardian comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries, we have 0 < A < 1.
Trade is costly. Firms that export need to pay a per-period fixed cost fzxrzw1−z which re-
quires both labor and capital. In addition, there are variable iceberg trade costs. Firms need to
ship τ units of goods for 1 unit of goods to arrive in the foreign market. Profit maximization
implies that the equilibrium price is a constant mark-up over the marginal cost. Hence, the
exports and domestic prices satisfy:
pzx(ϕ) = τ pzd(ϕ) = τ
rzw1−z
ρA(z)ϕ
(3.4)
where pzx(ϕ) and pzd(ϕ) are the export and domestic price, respectively. Given the pricing
rule, firms’ revenues from domestic and foreign market rzd(ϕ) and rzx(ϕ) are:
rzd(ϕ) = b(z)R
(
ρA(z)ϕP(z)
rzw1−z
)σ−1
(3.5)
rzx(ϕ) = τ1−σ
(
P(z)∗
P(z)
)σ−1 R∗
R
rzd(ϕ) (3.6)
where R and R∗ are aggregate revenues for home and foreign, respectively. Then the total
revenue of a firm is:
rz(ϕ) =
 rzd if it sells only domestically;rzx+ rzd if it exports.
Therefore, the firm’s profit can be divided into the two portions, profit earned from domestic
markets and profit earned from foreign markets:
pizd(ϕ) =
rzd
σ
− fzrzw1−z
pizx(ϕ) =
rzx
σ
− fzxrzw1−z (3.7)
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Thus, the total profit piz(ϕ) is given by:
piz(ϕ) = pizd(ϕ)+max{0,pizx(ϕ)} (3.8)
A firm with productivity ϕ produces if its revenue at least covers the fixed cost. That is pizd(ϕ)≥
0. Similarly, it exports if pizx(ϕ) ≥ 0. These define the productivity cut-off for zero-profit ϕz
and the productivity cut-off for exporting profit to be zero ϕzx, which satisfy:
rzd(ϕz) = σ fzr
zw1−z (3.9)
rzx(ϕzx) = σ fzxr
zw1−z (3.10)
Using the two equations above, we can derive the relationship between the two productivity
cut-offs:
ϕzx = Λzϕz, where Λz =
τP(z)
P(z)∗
[
fzxR
fzR∗
] 1
σ−1
. (3.11)
Λz > 1 implies selection into the export market: only the most productive firms export. The
empirical literature strongly supports selection into exporting. Therefore, we focus on param-
eters where exporters are always more productive, following Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al.
(2007a).19 Firms’ production and export decisions are shown in Figure 5. Each period, G(ϕz)
fraction of firms exit upon entry because they do not earn positive profit. And 1−G(ϕzx) frac-
tion of firms export because they have sufficiently high productivity and earn positive profit
from both domestic and foreign sales. Firms whose productivity is between ϕzxand ϕz sell only
in the domestic market. So the ex ante probability of exporting conditional on successful entry
χz is
χz =
1−G(ϕzx)
1−G(ϕz)
(3.12)
19Lu(2010) explores the possibility that Λz < 1 and documents that in the labor intensive sectors of China,
exporters are less productive. Dai et al (2011) argue for the importance of accounting for processing exporters.
And using TFP as the productivity measure instead of value added per worker, even including processing exporters
still support that exporters are more productive.
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Figure 5: Productivity Cut-offs and Firm Decisions
3.3 Free entry
If a firm does produce, it faces a constant probability δ of bad shock every period in which
it is forced to exit. The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of firms
entering an industry Mez and a constant mass of firms producing Mz. The mass of firms entering
equals the mass of firms exiting:
(1−G(ϕz))Mez = δMz. (3.13)
The entry cost is given by fezrzw1−z. The expected profit of entry Vz comes from two parts:
the ex ante probability of successful entry times the expected profit from domestic market until
death and the ex ante probability of export times the expected profit from the export market
until death. Free entry implies
Vz =
1−G(ϕz)
δ
(pizd(ϕ̂z)+χzpizx(ϕ̂zx)) = fezrzw1−z (3.14)
where pizd(ϕ̂z) and χzpizd(ϕ̂zx) are the expected profit from serving the domestic and foreign
markets, respectively. ϕ̂z is the average productivity of all producing firms and ϕ̂zx is the average
productivity of all exporting firms. They are defined as:
ϕ̂z = (
1
1−G(ϕz)
∞∫
ϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ)
1
σ−1
ϕ̂zx = (
1
1−G(ϕzx)
∞∫
ϕzx
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ)
1
σ−1 (3.15)
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Combining the free entry condition (3.14) with the zero profit conditions (3.9), (3.10), the pro-
ductivity cut-offs ϕz and ϕzx satisfy:
fz
δ
∞∫
ϕz
[
(
ϕ
ϕz
)σ−1−1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ+
fzx
δ
∞∫
ϕzx
[
(
ϕ
ϕzx
)σ−1−1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ = fez (3.16)
3.4 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, the sum of domestic and foreign spending on domestic varieties equals the value
of total industry revenue:
Rz = b(z)RMz
(
pzd(ϕ̂z)
P(z)
)1−σ
+χzb(z)R∗Mz
(
pzx(ϕ̂zx)
P(z)∗
)1−σ
(3.17)
where the price index P(z) is given by the equation below. R and R∗ are home and foreign
aggregate revenues. R∗z and P(z)∗ are defined in a symmetric way.
P(z) =
[
Mz pzd(ϕ̂z)1−σ +χ∗z M
∗
z p
∗
zx(ϕ̂
∗
zx)
1−σ] 11−σ (3.18)
The factor market clearing conditions are:
L =
1∫
0
l(z)dz, L∗ =
1∫
0
l∗(z)dz (3.19)
K =
1∫
0
k(z)dz, K∗ =
1∫
0
k∗(z)dz
3.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the vector of {ϕz, ϕzx, P(z), pz(ϕ), pzx(ϕ), r, w, R, ϕ∗z , ϕ∗zx, P(z)∗,
pz(ϕ)∗, pzx(ϕ)∗, r∗, w∗, R∗} for z ∈ [0,1]. It is determined by the following conditions:
(a) Firms’ pricing rule (3.4) for each industry and each country;
(b) Free entry condition (3.14) and the relationship between two zero profit productivity
cut-offs (3.11) for each industry and both countries;
(c) Factor market clearing condition (3.19);
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(d) The pricing index (3.18) implied by consumer and producer optimizations;
(e) The world goods market clearing condition(3.17).
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium given by {ϕz,ϕzx,P(z), pz(ϕ), pzx(ϕ),r,w,R,ϕ∗z ,
ϕ∗zx, P(z)∗, pz(ϕ)∗, pzx(ϕ)∗, r∗, w∗, R∗}.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
The presence of trade cost, multiple factors, heterogeneous firms, asymmetric countries, and in-
finite industry make it difficult to find a closed-form solution to the model. Therefore, we make
two assumptions to simplify the algebra. First, we assume that the idiosyncratic productivity is
Pareto distributed with the following density function:
g(ϕ) = aθ aϕ−(a+1),a+1 > σ
where θ is a lower bound of productivity: ϕ ≥ θ . 20 Second, we assume that the coefficients of
fixed costs are the same for all industries:
fz = fz′, fzx = fz′x, fez = fez′, ∀z 6= z′.
Proposition 2 (a) As long as the home country and the foreign country are sufficiently different
in endowment or technology, then there exist two factor-intensity cut-offs 0≤ z< z≤ 1 such that
the home country specializes in production within [0,z] whereas the foreign country specializes
in production within [z,1], while both countries produce within (z, z). (b) If there is no variable
trade cost (τ = 1) and fixed cost of export equals fixed cost of production for each industry
( fzx = fz,∀z), then we have z = z so that two countries completely specialize.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
20Some of our results do not depend on the assumption of Pareto distribution. We will point it out if this is the
case.
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Given our assumptions that LK >
L∗
K∗ and A< 1, the home country has comparative advantage
in labor-intensive industries. Proposition 2 and Figure 6 illustrate the production and trade pat-
tern under this scenario. Countries engage in inter-industry trade for industries within [0,z] and
[z,1], due to specialization.21 This is where the comparative advantage in factor abundance or
technology (classical trade theory) dominates trade costs and the power of increasing return and
imperfect competition (new trade theory). Countries engage in intra-industry trade in industries
within (z, z), where the power of increasing return to scale and imperfect competition domi-
nate the power of comparative advantage (Romalis, 2004). Thus, if the two countries are very
similar in terms of technology and endowment, the strength of comparative advantage would
be relatively weak, and there would be no specialization and only intra-industry trade between
the two countries. That is to say, z = 0 and z = 1. However, if trade is totally free, the classical
trade force dominates and full specialization arises as z= z, following the specialization pattern
in the classical DFS model. Finally, if A ≥ 1, it is possible that the Ricardian comparative ad-
vantage is strong enough to overturn the HO comparative advantage. In that case, the pattern
of production and trade will be reversed. The home country will specialize in [z,1] and foreign
country will specialize in [0,z].
Figure 6: Production and Trade Pattern
In the classical DFS model with zero transportation costs, factor price equalization (FPE)
prevails, and geographic patterns of production and trade are not determined when the two
countries are similar. With costly trade and departure from FPE, we can determine the pattern
of production. Our model thus inherits all the model properties in Romalis (2004). However,
his assumption of homogeneous firms leads to the stark feature that all firms export. With the
21For the industries that countries specialize, half of the potential trade flows are zeros. Helpman, Melitz and
Rubinstein (2008) generate zeros in trade flow assuming bounded productivity distribution. Due to specialization,
zeros in trade flows arise even with unbounded productivity distribution in our model.
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assumption of firm heterogeneity, export participation varies across industries in our model as
shown in the following two propositions.
Proposition 3 (a) Under a general productivity distribution g(ϕ) > 0, the zero-profit produc-
tivity cut-off decreases with the capital intensity, while the export cut-off increases with the
capital intensity within (z, z) in the home country. The converse holds in the foreign country.
(b) The cut-offs remain constant in product intervals which either country specializes.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
The proposition does not rely on the assumption of Pareto distribution and is an extension
of Bernard et al. (2007a). Their discussion is limited to the cases that both countries produce
within the diversification cone and no specialization occurs. Our conclusion (b) extends the
property to the cases of specialization. Figure 7 illustrates these results for both home and
foreign countries.
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Figure 7: Productivity cut-offs
Proposition 4 (a) Under the general productivity distribution g(ϕ) > 0, the probability of ex-
porting χz is constant for industries in which either country specializes and decreases with
capital intensity in home country within (z,z), and vice versa for the foreign country. If the
productivity distribution is Pareto, we have
χz =
 R
∗
f R z ∈ [0,z]
τ˜−a f−εah(z)
εa f h(z)−τ˜a z ∈ (z,z)
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where h(z)≡
(
w
w∗ (
r/w
r∗/w∗ )
z
) aσ
1−σ
, τ˜ ≡ τ( f ) 1σ−1 and for z ∈ (z,z)
∂χz
∂ z
= B(z)
[
ln(A)− σ
σ −1 ln
(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)]
, B(z)> 0.
(b) The export intensity is: γz = f χz1+ f χz which follows the same pattern as χz.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
Proposition 4 is a straightforward implication of Proposition 3. It says that the stronger the
comparative advantage is, the larger the share of firms that participate in international trade.
For industries that countries specialize, goods are supplied by only one country and export
participation is a constant. This is illustrated in Figure 8. The left panel shows that export
participation decreases with capital intensity in the home country. The right panel shows an
opposite pattern for the foreign country.
Figure 8: Export participation
Now we add the assumption that the idiosyncratic shock is drawn from a Pareto distribution.
The assumption of Pareto distribution leads to explicit expressions and allows us to examine the
sign of ∂χz∂ z within (z,z): it depends on the Ricardian comparative advantage ln(A) and the
Heckscher-Ohlin Comparative Advantage ln
(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)
. The magnitude of the HO comparative
advantage depends on σ , the elasticity of substitution between varieties: the smaller σ is, the
more that industries differ in their export participation. Since A < 1 and KL <
K∗
L∗ , home country
has both Ricardian comparative advantage and HO comparative advantage in labor-intensive
industries. Thus we expect ∂χz∂ z < 0, and the probability of export decreases with capital inten-
sities in the home country. However, if A > 1 and the home country has Ricardian comparative
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advantage in capital-intensive industries, then the sign of ∂χz∂ z depends on which comparative
advantage is stronger. If Ricardian comparative advantage is strong enough to overturn the HO
advantage, then the home country will export more in capital-intensive industries.
The key insight from the Melitz model is that selection into exports leads to within-sector
resource reallocation and brings productivity gains. Bernard et al. (2007a) find that the strength
of reallocation is stronger in the industry that the country has comparative advantage. Such dif-
ferential reallocation effects will generate productivity differences across sectors and countries.
They refer to such a mechanism as ”the endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage”. In the
following proposition, we show how to quantify such a mechanism.
Proposition 5 (a) The average idiosyncratic firm productivity in each industry is
ϕ̂z =C(1+ f χz)1/a
where C is a constant. Within (z,z), it increases with the strength of comparative advantage as
reflected by χz. Within the specialization zone [0,z], it is a constant.
(b) For sectors within (z,z), that both countries produce, so that the Ricardian comparative
advantage can be decomposed into two components as:
Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= λAz︸︷︷︸
exogenous
(
1+ f χz
1+ f χ∗z
)1/a︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
Proof. See Appendix 8.5.
According to conclusion (a), opening to trade brings productivity gains, because χz would
increase from zero to some positive number. The productivity gains will be larger if the share
of exporters is higher. In conclusion (b), the relative industry productivity between home and
foreign country is decomposed into an exogenous component and an endogenous component
that varies with the relative extent of export selection. The home country can be relatively more
productive either because industry-wide productivity is higher or because relatively more firms
are selected to export.
Moreover, the endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage can amplify or dampen the
exogenous component, depending on how the relative share of exporters varies across indus-
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tries. If the HO comparative advantage is so strong that the share of exporters is relatively
lower in industries with strong exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage, then the exoge-
nous Ricardian comparative advantage would be dampened. For example, suppose A > 1 and
λAz increases with z. Hence, the home country has exogenous Ricardian comparative advan-
tage in capital-intensive industries. However, if LK/
L∗
K∗ is so high that home country has strong
HO comparative advantage in the labor-intensive industries and ln(A) < σσ−1 ln(
r
w/
r∗
w∗ ). Then,
according to Proposition 4, ∂χz∂ z is negative and χz is lower in the capital-intensive industries.
Conversely, χ∗z is higher in the capital intensive industries. Then (
1+ f χz
1+ f χ∗z
)1/a declines with z and
the endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage is weaker in capital-intensive industries.
5 Numerical Solution
In this subsection, we parametrize the model and solve it numerically. The purpose of this
section is twofold. The first is to visualize the equilibrium. The second is to study how the
equilibrium responds to changes in endowment, technology, and trade costs.
The parametrization of the model is shown in Table 5, following Bernard et al. (2007a).
We set the initial endowment such that the home country has HO advantage in labor-intensive
industries. Initial technology parameters are chosen such that there is no Ricardian comparative
advantage. We normalize the expenditure function b(z) to be 1 for all industries so that the
variation of outputs and firm mass is driven only by comparative advantage. Figure 9 plots
the conditional probability of exporting and firm mass distribution across industries. Given our
symmetric parameters, the two countries produce and export symmetrically; countries produce
and export more in industries in which they have stronger comparative advantage.
5.1 Comparative Statics
It is hard to get general results for comparative statics in this model. Instead, to better understand
the mechanics of the model, we conduct a few numerical comparative statics by changing one
parameter at a time. We consider effects of increasing K (capital deepening in home country),
decreasing A (strengthening Ricardian comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries),
and reducing trade costs (trade liberalization). We are interested in the effects on production,
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Table 5: Numerical solution: parametrization
Variables Definition Value
K home capital stock 100
L home labor stock 300
K∗ foreign capital stock 300
L∗ foreign labor stock 100
fzx/ fz relative fixed cost of export 1.5
fez/ fz relative fixed cost of entry 30
τ iceberg trade cost 1.8
a shape parameter of Pareto Distribution 3.8
θ lower bound of Pareto Distribution 0.2
δ exogenous death probability of firms 0.025
σ elasticity of substitution 3.4
A strength of comparative advantage 1
λ strength of absolute advantage 1
b(z) expenditure share 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Export propensity across industries
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
Distribution of firms across industries
home
foreign
Notes: The figures are generated using the parameters specified in Table 5.
Figure 9: Benchmark Solution
exports, and productivity.
The first exercise is to increase K from 100 to 200. The results shown in Figure 10 indicate
that: 1) z increases and z decreases. That is, as two countries become similar in endowment, the
measure of industries in which both counties produce [z,z] increases. 2) For firm mass M(z), we
have ∂ (M
′(z)−M(z))
∂ z > 0. Furthermore, as Figure 10 (a) indicates, there exists a sector cut-off z1
such that M(z) increases for z≥ z1 while decreases for z < z1. These results are consistent with
the well-known Rybczynski theorem that production shifts to capital-intensive industries as the
home country becomes more capital abundant. 3) As z increases, sectoral export probability
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increases. That is, ∂ (χ
′
z−χz)
∂ z > 0. Furthermore, as panel (b) indicates, there exists a sector cut-off
z2 such that χz increases for z≥ z2 while decreases for z< z2. Similar results hold for the sectoral
export intensity. 4) The selection effect changes the sectoral productivity. Using result (a) of
Proposition 5, we immediately see that changes in export probability induce changes in sectoral
productivity. Thus, as z increases, sectoral productivity increases, and sectoral productivity
increases for z ≥ z2 whereas sectoral productivity decreases for z < z2. To summarize, these
results indicate that distributions of firms’ mass, export probability/intensity, and productivity
across industries all follow the ”single crossing property” when the relative endowment changes.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.002
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0.008
0.01
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0.016
Distribution of firms across industries
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Export propensity across industries
(b)
Notes: The solid lines are for the benchmark case with K = 100. The dash lines are for the case with K = 200.
Figure 10: Capital deepening
The second exercise reduces A, the parameter capturing Ricardian comparative advantage,
from 1 to 0.5, which we call sector-bias technology change. Such a sector-bias technology
change favors labor-intensive industries at home by making them relatively more productive to
RoW. The results are presented in Figure 11, which indicate that 1) z decreases and z increases,
so that the home country specialize more in labor-intensive industries; 2) ∂ (M
′(z)−M(z))
∂ z < 0; 3)
∂ (χ ′z−χz)
∂ z < 0; and 4) Because the productivity in labor-intensive industries increases more, the
selection effect reinforces the comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. Note that
results 2), 3) and 4) also follow a ”single crossing property”, however, in the opposite direction
to the case of capital deepening.
The third exercise reduces the iceberg trade cost τ from 1.8 to 1.5. From Proposition 2 we
know that free trade will lead to complete specialization. Thus, a reduction in τ tends to result in
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more specialization. That is, z would (weakly) increase and z decreases. That is indeed the case
in Figure 12. As expected, trade liberalization increases export probability and export intensity.
Moreover, production shifts to the comparative advantage industries.
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0.8
1
Export propensity across industries
(b)
Notes: The solid lines are for the benchmark case with A = 1. The dash lines are for the case with A = 0.5.
Figure 11: Sector-bias technology change
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Notes: The solid lines are for the benchmark case with τ = 1.8. The dash lines are for the case with τ = 1.5.
Figure 12: Trade liberalization
So far, we have only shown the numerical comparative statics for two specific parameters
in each experiment. We now present the aggregate moments from the model over a wider
range of parameters. These moments include the share of capital-intensive firms (capital inten-
sity z≥ 0.5), the average export propensity for labor-intensive industries (z≤ 0.5) and capital-
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intensive industries. The results are shown in Figure 13. In panel (a), we simulate capital deep-
ening by increasing K from 40 to 300. The share of capital-intensive firms increases as home
country becomes more capital abundant. The average export propensity for labor-intensive in-
dustries drops and vice versa for capital-intensive industries. Panel (b) simulates sectoral bias
technology change by increasing A from 0.3 to 1.5. As the home country gains Ricardian com-
parative advantage in capital-intensive industries, the share of capital-intensive firms and their
export propensity both increase. Panel (c) simulates trade liberalization with τ varying from 1.1
to 2.2. Still, trade liberalization favors the comparative advantage industries and boosts their
production and exports. Our numerical results are summarized together in Table 6. The key
lessons we have learned are:
K
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A
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0.2
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0.4
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0.6
(b)
τ
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
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0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
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0.7
the share of firm mass for z ≥ 0.5
average χz for z ≤ 0.5
average χz for z ≥ 0.5
(c)
Notes: Panel (a) simulates capital deepening by increasing K from 40 to 300. Panel (b) simulates sectoral
technology bias by varying A from 0.3 to 1.5. Panel (c) simulates trade liberalization with τ decreasing from
2.2 to 1.1.
Figure 13: Numerical comparative statics on aggregate moments
Property 1: As the capital endowment increases in the labor abundant home country, dis-
tributions of firms’ mass, export probability/intensity, and productivity across industries all fol-
low the ”single crossing property”. That is, there exist cut-off capital intensities for industries
such that firms’ mass, export probability/intensity, and productivity increase for more capital-
intensive industries, but decrease for more labor-intensive industries.
Property 2: For the sector-bias technology change that strengthens Ricardian comparative
advantage in labor intensive industries, distributions of firms’ mass, export probability/intensity,
and productivity across industries also follow the ”single crossing property”, but in the opposite
direction to the case of capital deepening.
Property 3: Trade liberalization strengthens existing comparative advantage by widening
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the range of industries in which each country specializes. Countries become more specialized
as output and export both shift to comparative advantage industries.
Table 6: Numerical comparative statics
share of
capital
average χz for average χz for cut-off
industry
cut-off
industry
intensive firms labor intensive capital
intensive
for home for foreign
(z≥ z1) industries
(z6 z2)
industries
(z≥ z2)
specialization
z
specialization
z
capital deepening (K ↑) + − + − +
sector-bias technology change (A ↓) − + − + −
trade liberalization (τ ↓) − + −
Notes: The variables are for the labor abundant home country. For the capital deepening experiment, we keep
all the benchmark parameters except K. Similarly, only A varies for the experiment of sector-bias technology
change and τ varies for the experiment of trade liberalization. z1 is is the cut-off industry which the share of
firm mass does not change in the comparative statics. z2 is the cut-off industry which the export probability
does not change in the comparative statics.
5.2 Discussion
If we believe capital had been deepening in China during the period 1999-2007, panel (a) of
Figure 10 is consistent with the Stylized fact 1 that Chinese production became more capital-
intensive. However, panel (b) is to the opposite of the Stylized fact 2 that the share of exporters
increased in labor-intensive industries and dropped in capital-intensive industries. If trade liber-
alization was the main story and China had comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries,
the Stylized fact 1 is at odds with panel (a) of Figure 12. According to Figure 11, if sector-bias
technology change was the sole driving force, production and exports should have both become
more labor-intensive or capital-intensive, depending on which industries the bias was favoring.
However, this cannot be reconciled with stylized facts 1 and 2. In sum, none of these forces
alone can explain all the stylized facts. We need to estimate and gauge the movement of each
force over time to disentangle their individual effect. This is what we do in the next section.
6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we conduct a quantitative analysis of the model economy. We treat China as the
home country and RoW as the foreign country. We first calibrate and structurally estimate the
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model parameters by fitting the model to the Chinese data. To disentangle the driving forces
behind the pattern of structural adjustments that we observe in Section 2, we run counterfactual
experiments by turning on different channels in the estimated model. The estimated model also
allows us to decompose the Ricardian comparative advantage and productivity growth. Finally,
we analyze the source of welfare gains and check the robustness of the estimation results.
6.1 Parametrization and Estimation
A subset of the parameters is based on data statistics or estimates from the literature. As first
proved by Chaney (2008) and also in Arkolakis et al. (2012), trade elasticity in the Melitz model
with Pareto distribution assumption is governed by the Pareto shape parameter. Thus we set the
Pareto shape parameter a = 3.43, the median trade elasticity estimated by Broda et al (2006)
for China. We will later test the robustness of our estimates by varying the trade elasticity from
the lower end to the higher end of the estimates in the literature. Next, to infer the elasticity of
substitution σ , we regress the logarithm of an individual firm’s rank in sales on the logarithm
of firm sales.22 The estimated coefficient is 0.774, with a standard error of 0.001. According to
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), this coefficient would be a− (σ −1). Thus, the elasticity
of substitution is σ = 3.43+1−0.774 = 3.66.
We normalize the labor supply for China to be 1. The relative labor endowment L
∗
L is
calculated for both 1999 and 2007 using data from the World Bank as the ratio of industrial
employment.23 Next, from Proposition 8.4, export intensity and probability of export for each
industry are related to each other as γz = f χz1+ f χz . Thus we can infer the relative fixed cost
of exports as f = γzχz(1−γz) for each industry. Our estimation for f is the average across all
industries. The estimated results are 1.00 and 1.77 for 1999 and 2007, respectively.24 Finally,
the expenditure share function is estimated as the consumption share for each industry where
consumption is accounted as output plus net imports. We observe only output and exports from
22The coefficient is estimated by polling the data from two years together using OLS, controlling year-industry
fixed effects.
23Industrial employment is computed by multiplying the total labor force with the share industrial employment
and employment rate. World Bank Database doesn’t provide industrial employment share for the whole world in
year 1999 and 2007. We take data from the closest available year: year 2000 and 2005 respectively.
24This does not mean the fixed cost of export was increasing from 1999 to 2007. It can be the case both the
fixed costs of sales at home and export were declining but the fixed cost of export was falling slower. Appendix
9.2 plots the estimated f by industry.
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the firm survey. To infer imports, we match the firm survey data with the customs data from
2000 to 2006.25 For each of the 100 industries, we compute the ratio of aggregate imports to
aggregate exports of the matched firms. Then the imports of each industry are estimated as
the aggregate exports of all firms multiplied by the ratio. We then compute expenditure as the
output plus next exports for each industry, and then compute the expenditure function b(z) as
the average of expenditure share during the period of 2000 and 2006. The estimated b(z) is
shown in the Appendix 9.2. These are all the parameters calibrated before the main estimation,
which is also summarized in Table 7.
Table 7: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Value Source
Pareto shape a 3.43 Broda et al (2006)
Elasticity of substitution σ 3.66 Estimated according to Helpman et al (2004)
relative labor size L∗/L year1999 : 2.49year2007 : 2.22
Ratio of industrial labor force (World Bank).
Relative fixed cost of export f
year1999 : 1.00
year2007 : 1.77
Inferred from γz = f χz1+ f χz
Expenditure share b(z) Consumption share while C(z)=Y(z)-EXP(z)+IMP(z)
with imports inferred from matched firm and customs data
Notes: The estimated f is the average across industries for each year. b(z) is averaged over 2000 and 2006.
They are plotted in the Appendix 9.2.
Turning to the remaining parameters {K∗K , K/L, A, λ , τ}, we estimate them using method
of moments. The first target moment is the relative size of China and RoW, measured by the
aggregation revenue ratio R∗/R. It is calculated using the ratio of manufacturing output between
RoW and China using World Bank data.26 Secondly, we target the empirical feature on industry-
level exporter share and capital intensity. The average share of exporters for the capital-intensive
industries (z ≥ 0.5) and labor-intensive industries (z ≤ 0.5) are chosen as the estimation target
moments. Finally, average capital intensity and capital intensity for exporters are also included.
Thus, we use five moments to estimate five parameters.27
25The customs data uses different firm identifier from the firm survey. We match them by firm name, address,
post code and phone number. About 30%-40% of the exporters in the firm data are matched. The distribution of
export across industries is almost identical for the matched exporters and all exporters from the firm data. Thus the
matched firms are unlikely to be selected.
26Manufacturing output is estimated as nominal GDP multiplied by the share of manufacturing in aggregate
GDP.
27Appendix 9.4 provides more details about the estimation method. Appendix 9.5 shows that the lower bound
θ of the Pareto distribution, the exogenous death probability of firms δ , the fixed entry cost fez and fixed cost
production fz are irrelevant for the these moments.
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We estimate the model parameters separately for the years 1999 and 2007. Table 8 reports
the estimated parameters. First, China became more capital abundant in 2007. The relative
capital stock of RoW to China dropped from 3.50 to 2.54, and the capital labor ratio of China
more than doubled its level in 1999 from 0.907 to 2.03. Second, China became more productive
compared with RoW, especially in labor-intensive industries. As we can see, the parameter
capturing the absolute advantage λ increased from 0.125 to 0.355. Thus the gap in sectoral TFP
between China and RoW shrank in every industry.28 More importantly, the parameter capturing
exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage A switched from > 1 to < 1. This implies that the
productivity growth in China must have been relatively faster in the labor-intensive industries
during this period.29 Although we cannot observe the TFP for RoW in each industry or directly
measure the Ricardian comparative advantage, we do observe that TFP growth is relatively
faster in the labor-intensive industries in China, as is shown in Figure 4 in the Stylized fact 3.
Finally, the variable iceberg trade cost τ decreased by about 25%, from 2.38 to 1.76. This is not
surprising given the trade liberalization that China experienced after joining the WTO in 2001.
Table 8: Estimation Results
Parameters K
∗
K K/L A λ τ
Year 1999 3.50 0.907 1.31 0.125 2.38
(0.004) (0.02) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2007 2.54 2.03 0.739 0.355 1.76
(0.02) (0.015) (0.009) (0.0002) (0.001)
Notes: This table presents the estimation results. K
∗
K is the relative endowment of home and RoW. K/L is
the capital labor ratio at home. A captures the Ricardian comparative advantage. λ captures the absolute
comparative advantage. τ measures the iceberg trade cost. The numbers in the parentheses are bootstrapped
standard errors. In each boostrap, we use a sample with replacement from the data to generate the target
moments and redo the estimation. We perform 25 boostraps for each year.
We then examine the fitting of our model. Table 9 shows the fitting of the targeted moments.
As can be seen in the table, we match the target moments reasonably well. Table 10 shows the
fitting of non-targeted aggregate moments. The model matches the aggregate exporter share
and aggregate export intensity relatively well. The aggregate export intensity in the model
has a slightly higher level and shows a bigger increase compared with the data. The model
28Our estimate of the relative productivity between China and RoW is close to the estimate by di Giovanni et al.
(2014). They estimate that average productivity of China relative to RoW is about 0.34 in the 2000s. According to
our estimate, the weighted average of relative productivity of China to the RoW is 0.16 in 1999 and 0.30 in 2007.
29This is consistent with the finding by Levchenko and Zhang (2016) that productivity tends to grow faster in
industries with greater initial comparative disadvantage.
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also predicts a significant wage growth in China relative to RoW. In 1999, average wage for
RoW was about 6.5 times that of China, declining to around 3 times in 2007. Such relative
wage growth is close to what we observe.30 As we will show in the counterfactual, such wage
growth is mostly driven by technology change favoring labor-intensive industries, less by the
increasing scarcity of labor to capital, least by the trade liberalization. The model also generates
distribution of firm and exporter shares across industries. The fitting is illustrated in Figure 14.
The estimated model closely matches not only the static patterns but also the changes over time.
In sum, our model estimation can quantitatively account for both the changes in the aggregate
economy as well as the structural adjustment in Chinese production and exports from 1999 to
2007.
Table 9: Model fit: target moments
Data Model
Year 1999 2007 1999 2007
R∗/R 16.74 7.47 16.74 7.47
exporter share: z≤ 0.5 0.312 0.42 0.315 0.423
exporter share: z≥ 0.5 0.241 0.234 0.238 0.228
capital intensity for all firms 0.667 0.707 0.659 0.688
capital intensity for all exporters 0.623 0.619 0.630 0.633
Notes: The current table demonstrates the fitting of the moments that are included in the estimation.
Table 10: Model fit: non-target moments
Data Model
Year 1999 2007 1999 2007
aggregate exporter share 0.253 0.249 0.241 0.230
aggregate export intensity 0.181 0.208 0.189 0.284
relative wage: w*/w 6.43 2.89
Notes: The current table computes moments that are not included in the estimation using estimation results
from Table 8 and compares them against data.
30According to ILO (2013, 2014), the world real wage growth between 1999 and 2007 is 20.4%. The world
CPI grew by 33.5% during 1999-2007 according to World Bank data. Thus the nominal wage grew by 60.7%
((1+20.4%)(1+33.5%)-1). For the same period, the nominal wage of China grew by 168%. So the relative wage
growth of the World to China is w
W
2007/w
C
2007
wW1999/w
C
1999
=
wW2007
wW1999
/
wC2007
wC1999
= (1+60.7%)/(1+168%) = 60.0%. If we are willing
to accept that the wage of RoW is very close to the whole world, the same calculation using our estimate is
w∗2007/w2007
w∗1999/w
C
1999
= 2.896.43 = 44.9%. Thus our estimate of the relative wage growth of China to RoW from our model
accounts a significant proportions of wage growth in China.
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Figure 14: Model fit: non-targeted production and export
6.2 Counterfactual
In this subsection, we conduct counterfactual experiments to investigate the driving forces be-
hind the structural adjustments of Chinese production and exports discussed in Section 2. In
each experiment, we replace the estimated parameters of 1999 with those of 2007, one subset
of parameters at a time. The first experiment replaces the technology parameters {A,λ}. The
second one replaces the trade cost parameters {τ , f}. The last one replaces the endowment
parameters {L∗L ,K
∗
K , K/L}. The results are presented in Table 11 and Figure 15.
Table 11: Counterfactual
Baseline Model Counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
year 1999 2007 A and λ τ and f endowments
R∗/R 16.74 7.47 10.31 16.22 12.31
exporter share: z≤ 0.5 0.315 0.423 0.559 0.435 0.196
exporter share: z≥ 0.5 0.238 0.228 0.193 0.352 0.196
capital intensity for all firms 0.659 0.688 0.659 0.655 0.694
capital intensity for all exporters 0.630 0.633 0.538 0.634 0.694
aggregate exporter share 0.241 0.230 0.221 0.357 0.196
aggregate export intensity 0.189 0.284 0.161 0.381 0.164
relative wage: w*/w 6.43 2.89 3.44 6.04 5.81
Notes: Column (1) and (2) are model results using the parameters estimated in Table 8. Column (3) replaces
the estimated technology parameters {A,λ} of 1999 by the estimates of 2007 and keeps other parameters un-
changed. Column (4) replaces {τ, f} of 1999 by the estimates of 2007 and keeps other parameters unchanged.
Column (5) replaces {L∗L , K
∗
K ,
K
L } of 1999 by the estimates of 2007 and keeps other parameters unchanged.
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Our first finding is that the rise of China is mostly driven by productivity growth, less by
changes in endowment, and least by trade liberalization. The relative size of RoW to China R
∗
R
drops from 16.74 to 10.29 when we change {A,λ} in column (3) of Table 11. This change in the
relative size of RoW to China is about 70% of actual change from 16.74 to 7.47. The magnitude
is significantly smaller in column (4) and (5) when we run the other two counterfactuals. This
is consistent with the findings by Zhu (2012) and Tombe and Zhu (2015), who also find that
the growth of China is mostly driven by productivity growth.31 Similar to us, Tombe and Zhu
(2015) also find that trade liberalization with RoW only contributes a small fraction to the
growth of China. A similar conclusion holds for relative wage w
∗
w . It drops by about a half when
we replace {A,λ}.
Our second finding is that, change in endowment is the primary driver of more capital-
intensive production. The capital intensity of all firms barely changes when we replace {A,λ}
or {τ , f} but increases from 0.659 to 0.694 when we replace the endowment parameters. As
China became more capital abundant in 2007, China’s comparative disadvantage in the capital-
intensive industries was weakened. Hence, expected profit rose in capital-intensive industries.
Furthermore, as capital became relative cheaper, fixed entry costs in capital-intensive industries
also decreased. In the end, more firms entered capital-intensive industries. However, according
to our estimates China gained Ricardian comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries in
2007. Given the changes in {A,λ}, expected profit of operating in the labor-intensive industries
increased. Wages also increased, however, this drove up the fixed entry costs for labor-intensive
industries. Rising expected profit and rising fixed entry costs balanced out, leaving firm mass
distribution almost unchanged.
Because trade liberalization benefited comparative advantage industries more, we would
expect an expansion of the labor-intensive industries. But the effect turned out to be quite small.
These results are also demonstrated in the left panel of Figure 15. Only in the counterfactual
experiment with endowment can we see the firm mass distribution shifting to capital-intensive
industries.
Finally, technological changes drove the phenomena whereby exporters did not become
more capital-intensive, and export participation increased in labor-intensive industries but dropped
31Zhu (2012) uses a growth accounting approach. Tombe and Zhu(2015) calibrate a general equilibrium model
of trade and migration.
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in capital-intensive ones. As is evident from Table 11, only when {A,λ} is replaced does the
average capital intensity of exporters fall. This is due to a significant rise of exporters in labor-
intensive industries and a decline in the capital-intensive ones. Export participation increases
universally when we replace {τ , f}. When replacing the endowment parameters, exporter
share declines everywhere, more so in the labor-intensive industries, making exporters more
labor-intensive on average.
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Figure 15: Counterfactuals
6.3 Decompose the Ricardian Comparative Advantage and Productivity
Growth
With the estimated parameters, we can decompose Ricardian comparative advantage into ex-
ogenous and endogenous components using results from Proposition 5. This channel is first
discovered in Bernard et al. (2007a) which prove the theoretical possibility of such a channel.
Proposition 5 allows us to evaluate its quantitative relevance. According to Proposition 5, the
Ricardian comparative advantage can be decomposed as:
Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= λAz︸︷︷︸
exogeneous
(
1+ f χz
1+ f χ∗z
)1/a︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
.
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The exogenous component can be readily estimated using λ and A from Table 8. We measure
the endogenous component directly using the share of exporter for each industry χz and χ∗z .
Although χ∗z is not observable, we can show that χ∗z = χ−1z
(
τ f
1
σ−1
)−2a
. So χ∗z can be calcu-
lated given the observed χz, and σ , a, τ , and f .32 Figure 16 illustrates the decomposition for
both 1999 and 2007. The red triangle lines capture the exogenous component λAz and the blue
dotted lines captures both the exogenous and endogenous components. The difference between
the two lines is due to the endogenous component. The estimated exogenous Ricardian com-
parative advantage favored the labor-intensive industries in 2007. Since the exporter share is
relatively higher in labor-intensive industries, the endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage
also favors labor-intensive industries. Thus, the exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage is
amplified by the endogenous component. Therefore, the blue dotted line for 2007 is steeper
than the red triangle line. The situation is exactly reversed in 1999. The estimated exogenous
Ricardian comparative advantage favored the capital-intensive industries and was dampened by
the endogenous component.
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Figure 16: Decomposition of Ricardian comparative advantage
We can apply such decomposition not only for cross sectional productivity differences but
also productivity growth over time. Let x and x′ denote variable x for current period and next
32The estimated χ∗z is plotted in Figure A5 in the Appendix. The share of exporters to China in RoW is signifi-
cantly lower than the share of exporters in China to RoW, driven by the fact that RoW is much larger than China.
It increases with capital intensity, consistent with RoW’s comparative advantage in the capital-intensive industries.
It also increases over time, especially for the capital-intensive industries, due to the trade liberalization and the
growing size of China. This identification result is similar to the Head-Ries index (Head and Ries, 2001) where
they trade costs for given ratios of export to domestic absorption while we infer export participation for given trade
costs.
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period, respectively. Sectoral productivity growth is decomposed as: 33
E(A(z)′ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕ ′z)
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕz)
=
A(z)′
A(z)
ϕ̂ ′z
ϕ̂z
=
A(z)′
A(z)
(
1+ f ′χ ′z
1+ f χz
)
1
a
where A(z)
′
A(z) absorbs the industry-wide productivity growth and (
1+ f ′χ ′z
1+ f χz )
1
a captures productiv-
ity growth due to change in export selection. Figure 17 (a) plots the estimated productivity
growth by industry.34 As noted earlier, the productivity growth is higher in the labor-intensive
industries. The right panel plots (1+ f
′χ ′z
1+ f χz )
1
a . Since χz increased in the labor-intensive industries,
selection to export will lead to a disproportionally higher productivity growth in these industries.
Although exporter share declined for the capital-intensive industries, the relative higher fixed
costs of exports f in 2007 still implies tougher export selection. Overall, export selection leads
to productivity growth almost in every industry. We find that the average productivity growth
rate weighted by value added across all industries is about 144%. However, the weighted av-
erage of productivity growth rate driven by the export selection is about 3.1%. Hence, export
selection contributes about 2.1% of the overall productivity growth.35
6.4 Welfare Analysis
An estimated model also allows us to provide welfare analysis for China and RoW. Given
the logarithm utility we use, we measure welfare using equivalent real consumption given by
W ≡ exp(U). The exact welfare formula is specified in Appendix 8.6. Armed with estimated
parameters and the welfare formula, we first compare the welfare level of China with RoW, and
33The results is immediately from conclusion (a) of proposition 5 by assuming that the constant C is the same
over time. C depends on δ the exogenous death shock for firms, θ the lower bound of the support of Pareto
Distribution, and f˜ the relative fixed entry cost. Any changes in these 3 parameters will be absorbed by the
industry-wise productivity change in our accounting setting. If we could identify these 3 parameters, we can
further decompose the productivity growth.
34We do not observe growth in industry-wide productivity A(z)
′
A(z) directly. So we need to measure the left-hand
side of the equality in order to evaluate the contribution of endogenous selection given by ( 1+ f
′χ ′z
1+ f χz )
1
a . We estimate
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ≥ϕz)′
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ≥ϕz) as the growth of average sectoral productivity from 1999 to 2007. The sectoral productivity is
computed as the weighted average of firm level TFP as estimated by the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.
35The small contribution of export selection to overall productivity growth is not unique to this study. For
example, Baldwin and Gu (2003) find that Canadian plants entering the export market contribute very little overall
growth.
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Figure 17: Export selection and productivity growth
find
W1999
W ∗1999
= 8.2%,
W2007
W ∗2007
= 20%.
Though the welfare of China is much lower than RoW, it is catching up quickly. To gauge
the speed of welfare growth in China and RoW, we estimate the changes in real consumption
over time.36 The result is presented in column (1) of Table 12. We have W2007W1999 = 5.84 and
W ∗2007
W ∗1999
= 2.43, implying that in 1999 real consumption grows 24.7% for China and 11.7% for
RoW 37 To understand the source of these welfare gains, we compute the corresponding welfare
number in the counterfactual experiment discussed in the previous subsection. The results are
reported from column (2) to (4) in Table 12. 38 As can be seen, the welfare gain of China mostly
comes from changes in endowment and productivity growth, not from the trade liberalization.
For RoW, the welfare gain mostly comes from changes in endowment, less from productivity
growth, and least from the trade liberalization.
36As explained in Appendix 8.6, we assume the relative fixed entry cost f˜ , death probability δ and the lower
bound of the Pareto distribution θ are constant over time.
37To put these numbers into perspective, the real GDP per capita grows at 12.5% for China and 4.9% for RoW.
But since we only capture the manufacturing sector, these numbers are not directly comparable.
38In column (2), instead of replacing A, λ , we replace the estimated year 1999 sectoral productivity for China
A(z) and RoW A(z)∗ by those estimated for 2007. If we only replace A, λ , only changes the relative productivity
between China and RoW would be captured. And we would miss out the productivity growth over time in China
and RoW.
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Table 12: Counterfactual Welfare
Counterfactual
welfare (1) (2) (3) (4)
change Baseline A(z) and A(z)∗ τ and f endowments
W2007
W1999
5.84 2.32 1.02 2.38
W ∗2007
W ∗1999
2.43 1.31 1.01 1.84
Notes: Column (1) corresponds to the welfare growth rate computed using the estimated parameters from
Table 8, assuming the death shock δ , lower bound of productivity θ and the relative fixed cost of entry f˜ do
not change between 1999 and 2007. Column (2) computes the hypothetical welfare growth if only A(z) and
A(z)∗ have changed between 1999 and 2007. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) only change the trade costs and
endowments, respectively.
Table 13: Robustness checks on trade elasticity
Given Parameters Estimated Parameters
a σ year K*/K K/L A λ τ
2.5 2.73 1999 3.88 0.91 1.56 0.10 3.28
2007 2.88 2.03 0.82 0.33 2.10
5 5.23 1999 4.09 0.91 1.59 0.14 1.81
2007 2.76 2.03 0.89 0.36 1.49
7.5 7.73 1999 4.21 0.91 1.63 0.15 1.49
2007 2.34 2.03 0.77 0.36 1.31
Notes: Our baseline estimation result in Table 8 is obtained by setting the Pareto shape a = 3.43. This table
provides estimation results with a varying from 2.5 to 7.5.
6.5 Robustness
In this subsection, we conduct the robustness check of our estimation result. In our baseline,
we set the trade elasticity a = 3.43 based on the literature. We would like to know whether our
estimate is robust to alternative values. In Table 13, we vary the trade elasticity from 2.5 which
is at the lower end of the estimate in the literature to 7.5, which is at the higher end. By the
nature of our calibration, the elasticity of substitution σ also varies accordingly. It turns out that
the point estimate of each parameter varies with trade elasticity. However, the direction of the
changes in the estimated parameters are the same as our baseline estimation: across all cases,
K∗
K , A and τ decrease from 1999 to 2007, vice versa for
K
L and λ .
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first document the seemingly puzzling patterns of structural adjustments in
production and export based on comprehensive Chinese firm-level data: overall manufacturing
production became more capital-intensive whereas exports did not during the period 1999-2007;
export participation increased in labor-intensive industries but dropped in capital-intensive ones,
which counters our understanding from the Rybczynski Theorem of HO theory. To explain these
findings, we embed a Melitz-type heterogeneous firm model into the Ricardian and HO trade
theory with continuous industries.
We structurally estimate the model and find that China became relatively more capital abun-
dant over time, technology improved significantly and favored labor-intensive industries be-
tween 1999 and 2007. Trade liberalization reduced the variable trade costs by about a quarter.
By running counterfactual simulations, we find that the adjustment in production pattern is
mainly driven by changes in endowment whereas changes in export participation are mostly
driven by changes in technology. Using the estimated model, we find that export selection
shapes the Ricardian comparative advantage extensively but contributes only about 2.1% of
productivity growth over time. Finally, growth of output and welfare in China is driven mostly
by technology change, less by endowment and trade liberalization.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3 in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007a). The
complication is that we allow for specialization while they focus on cases within the diversifi-
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cation cone.39 The idea of the proof is as follows. We first write factor demands as functions of
the factor prices {w,w∗,r,r∗}. Then the factor market clearing conditions determine the equi-
librium factor prices. Once the factor prices are known, all the other equilibrium variables are
also determined.
For given factor prices, the total revenue for home country and foreign country are R =
wL+ rK and R∗ = w∗L∗+ r∗K∗, respectively. For industries that home country specializes, the
factor demands are l(z) = (1− z)b(z)(R+R∗)/w, k(z) = zb(z)(R+R∗)/r. Factor demands in
foreign country are symmetric. For industries that both countries produce, the industry revenue
function is given by Equation (3.17), thus we need to know the firm mass Mz and M∗z , the pricing
index P(z) and P(z)∗, and industry average productivity ϕ̂z and ϕ̂∗z in order to settle their factor
demands. We will use the model conditions to substitute for these terms. Starting from Equation
(3.17), we find that:
r(ϕ̂z)
r(ϕ̂∗z )
= p˜1−σz
( P(z)P(z)∗ )
σ−1+ R
∗
R τ
1−σχ
a+1−σ
a
z
R∗
R +χ
∗ a+1−σa
z τ1−σ ( P(z)P(z)∗ )
σ−1
(8.1)
where r(ϕ̂z) = RzMz is the average firm revenue, and p˜z ≡
pzd(ϕ̂z)
pzd(ϕ̂∗z )
=
ϕ̂∗z w
ε(z)ϕ̂zw∗
( r/wr∗/w∗ )
z is the relative
average domestic price between the two countries, with ε(z)≡ A(z)A∗(z) .
At the same time, using the zero profit conditions Equations (3.9) and (3.10), and the fact
that r(ϕ̂z)r(ϕz)
= ( ϕ̂zϕz
)σ−1, we find r(ϕ̂z) = ( fz( ϕ̂zϕz )
σ−1+χz fzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx )
σ−1)σrzw1−z. Combined with the
free entry condition, it can be shown that the average productivity between home and foreign
country is ϕ̂
∗
z
ϕ̂z
= (
1+ f χ∗z
1+ f χz )
1
a while f ≡ fzxfz . Using the Pareto distribution assumption, we find that
ϕ̂z
ϕz
= ϕ̂zxϕzx
= ( aa+1−σ )
1
σ−1 , and χz =
1−G(ϕzx)
1−G(ϕz) = Λ
−a
z , while Λz is the productivity cut-off ratio
defined in Equation (3.11). Combining these results, it can be shown that:
r(ϕ̂z)
r(ϕ̂∗z )
= ε p˜z(
1+ f χz
1+ f χ∗z
)
a+1
a , (8.2)
Using the definition of p˜z and combining Equation (8.1) and (8.2), we have:
χz =
τ˜−a f − εah(z)
εa f h(z)− τ˜a , (8.3)
39We will show how to determine the specialization pattern in proposition 2.
48
where h(z) = ( ww∗ (
r/w
r∗/w∗ )
z)
aσ
1−σ and τ˜ = τ f
1
σ−1 . From Equation (8.3), we find that χz is a function
of the factor prices. From Equation (3.11) we have Λz = χ
−1/a
z =
τP(z)
P(z)∗ (
f R
R∗ )
1/(σ−1), then P(z)P(z)∗ =
χ−1/az
τ (
R∗
f R)
1/(σ−1). which is also function of the factor prices. Combined with Equations (3.17)
and (3.18), the revenue for those industries that both countries produce are :
Rz = b(z)[
R
1− τ˜−aεa f h(z) −
f R∗
τ˜aεah(z)− f ], (8.4)
R∗z = b(z)ε
ah(z)[
R∗
εah(z)− f τ˜−a −
f R
τ˜a− εa f h(z)]. (8.5)
Both equations above are functions of factor prices. Using l(z) = (1− z)b(z)Rz/w and
k(z) = zb(z)Rz/r, the factor market clearing conditions for home country are given by:
∫
I(s)
(1− z)b(z)(R+R
∗)
w
dz+
∫
I(b)
(1− z)Rz
w
= L,
∫
I(s)
z
b(z)(R+R∗)
r
dz+
∫
I(b)
z
Rz
r
= K.
Another two symmetric equations can be written for the foreign country. I(s) is set of
the industries that home country specializes and while I(b) is the set of industries that both
countries produce. They are determined by cut-off industries where either the domestic or
foreign firm mass is zero using the result MzM∗z = p˜
σ−1
z
(
P(z)
P(z)∗ )
1−σ−χ−
a+1−σ
a
z τ˜−2(a+1−σ)τ1−σ
1−χ
a+1−σ
a
z τ1−σ ( P(z)P(z)∗ )
1−σ
40, which
is also determined by factor prices. These four factor demand equations together determine the
four factor prices {w,r,w∗,r∗}.
Once the factor prices are known, χz is pinned down for all industries which in turn deter-
mines the productivity cut-offs ϕz, and ϕzx. Once the cut-offs are known, average revenue for
each industry is given by r(ϕ̂z) = ( fz( ϕ̂zϕz )
σ−1+χz fzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx )
σ−1)σrzw1−z. Then we use the goods
market clearing condition Equation (3.17) to determine the firm mass for each industry. The
price index for each industry is also pinned down using Equation (3.18). 
40This is derived from Equation (3.18) defining price index
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose M∗z 6= 0, the relative firm mass between home and foreign can be extracted from Equa-
tion (3.18) as:
Mz
M∗z
= p˜σ−1z
( P(z)P(z)∗ )
1−σ −χ−
a+1−σ
a
z τ˜−2(a+1−σ)τ1−σ
1−χ
a+1−σ
a
z τ1−σ ( P(z)P(z)∗ )
1−σ
,
where we have used a result that χzχ∗z = τ˜−2a to replace χ∗z by χ−1z τ˜−2a. Since
P(z)
P(z)∗ =
χ−1/az
τ (
R∗
f R)
1/(σ−1) and p˜z =
ϕ̂∗z w
ε(z)ϕ̂zw∗
( r/wr∗/w∗ )
z, we have:
Mz
M∗z
= ε1−σ (
1+ f χ∗z
1+ f χz
)
σ−1
a [
w
w∗
(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)z]σ−1
f R
R∗ −χ−1z τ˜−2a f 2
1−χz f RR∗
τσ−1χ
σ−1
a .
If χz = R
∗
f R(
f
τ˜a )
2, we have MzM∗z = 0. Since M
∗
z > 0, it must be that Mz = 0. If χz decreases such that
χz < R
∗
f R(
f
τ˜a )
2, we have MzM∗z < 0. Since Mz cannot be negative, we should have Mz = 0 and foreign
will specialize in these industries. On the other hand, if χz increases such that χz approaches
R∗
f R and
Mz
M∗z
→ +∞, or say M∗zMz → 0, which implies M∗z = 0. If χz further increases such that
χz > R
∗
f R , we again have
M∗z
Mz
< 0. Since M∗z cannot be negative, M∗z stays at zero and home will
specialize in these industries. In summary, to maintain positive firm mass for both countries in
each industry, we must have:
R∗
f R
(
f
τ˜a
)2 < χz <
R∗
f R
,
where fτ˜a =
f
τa f
a
σ−1
< f
f
a
σ−1
< 1. If χz falls out of this range, one country’s firm mass is zero and
the other is positive. This is when specialization happens. For industries that both produce, we
have
χz =
τ˜−a f − εah(z)
εa f h(z)− τ˜a , (8.6)
which is a continuous and monotonic between [z,z].41 For the boundary industries z and z, since
we have
χz =
R∗
f R
and χz =
R∗
f R
(
f
τ˜a
)2,
41This is proved in proposition 4.
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evaluating Equation (8.6) at z and z, we have:
z =
ln(χzτ˜
a+ f τ˜−a
1+ f χz )− aσ1−σ ln( ww∗ )−a ln(λ )
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )+a ln(A)
,
z =
ln(χzτ˜
a+ f τ˜−a
1+ f χz )− aσ1−σ ln( ww∗ )−a ln(λ )
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )+a ln(A)
,
which are also determined given the factor prices. If we have free trade such that τ = f = 1, we
have χz = χz = R
∗
R , and z = z. The two countries completely specialize. 
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let’s focus on the home country. For any two industries z and z′, suppose z < z′, using the
definition of Λz Equation (3.11), and the assumption that variable trade costs and fixed costs are
the same for all industries, we have:
Λz
Λz′
=
P(z)/P(z′)
P(z)∗/P(z′)∗
.
If P(z)P(z′) <
P(z)∗
P(z′)∗ , that is labor intensive products are relatively cheaper in home country, then
Λz <Λz′. This is exactly what we will prove next. The idea is that if
P(z)
P(z′) <
P(z)∗
P(z′)∗ under autarky
and P(z)P(z′) =
P(z)∗
P(z′)∗ under free trade, then the costly trade case will fall between.
Under free trade, all firms export. The price of each variety and number of varieties are the
same for both countries. Thus the pricing index P(z) = P(z)∗ for all industries and we have
P(z)
P(z′) =
P(z)∗
P(z′)∗ .
At the other extreme of close economy, no firms export and from Equation (3.18) we have
P(z) = M
1
1−σ
z pzd(ϕ̂z). Firm mass for each industry is Mz =
b(z)R
r(ϕ̂z)
= b(z)Rr(ϕz)
(
ϕz
ϕ̂z
)σ−1. So P(z)P(z′) =
(wr )
(z′−z)/ρ( b(z)b(z′))
1
1−σ A(z
′)ϕz′
A(z)ϕz
. Using Equation (3.16) we have homogeneous cut-offs for all in-
dustries under autarky: ϕz′ = ϕz. Then it can be verified that
P(z)/P(z′)
P(z)∗/P(z′)∗
= (
w/r
w∗/r∗
)
z′−z
ρ Az
′−z.
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Since z′ > z and A < 1, then wr <
w∗
r∗ ⇐⇒ P(z)P(z′) <
P(z)∗
P(z′)∗ . We just need to show that
w
r <
w∗
r∗
under autarky. Using the factor market clearing condition, given the Cobb-Douglas forms for
production function, entry costs, and payments of fixed costs, we find that:
K
L
=
w
r
1∫
0
zb(z)dz
1∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz
,
K∗
L∗
=
w∗
r∗
1∫
0
zb(z)dz
1∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz
.
Thus KL <
K∗
L∗ ⇐⇒ wr < w
∗
r∗ and we establish that Λz < Λz′, or say Λz increases with z in home
country.
For industries that both countries produce, Equation (3.16) determines the cut-offs. It is
easy to see that the first term in the left hand side of the equation is a decreasing function of ϕz,
and the second term is a decreasing function of ϕzx, given that g(ϕ) > 0, ϕz ≤ ϕ and ϕzx ≤ ϕ
. Since Λz increases with z, it can be shown that either
∂ϕz
∂ z > 0 or
∂ϕz
∂ z = 0 cannot maintain the
equality of the equation.42 So it must be the case that ∂ϕz∂ z < 0. Then the first term of equation
(3.16) increases with z. To maintain the equation the second term must decrease with z. Thus
ϕzx should be an increasing function of z. Similar logic applies for the foreign country:
∂ϕ∗z
∂ z > 0
and ∂ϕ
∗
zx
∂ z < 0 .
For industries that home country specializes: M∗z = 0 and Mz > 0. Thus the price indexes
at home and foreign are: P(z) = M
1
1−σ
z pzd(ϕ̂z) and P(z)∗ = χ
1
1−σ
z M
1
1−σ
z pzx(ϕ̂zx). So we have
Λz = τP(z)P(z)∗ (
f R
R∗ )
1
σ−1 = χ
1
σ−1
z
ϕ̂zx
ϕ̂z
( f RR∗ )
1
σ−1 . Using the definition of ϕ̂z and ϕ̂zx , we have Λz =
(χz
1
1−G(ϕzx)
∞∫
ϕzx
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
1
1−G(ϕz)
∞∫
ϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
)
1
σ−1 ( f RR∗ )
1
σ−1 = (
∞∫
Λzϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
∞∫
ϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
)
1
σ−1 ( f RR∗ )
1
σ−1 which is an implicit func-
tion ofΛz and ϕz. Moreover, the free entry condition
fz
δ
∞∫
ϕz
[
( ϕϕz
)σ−1−1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ+ fzxδ
∞∫
Λzϕz
[
( ϕϕzx
)σ−1−1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ =
fez is also an implicit function of Λz and ϕz. Solving these two equations together we would
have Λz and ϕz. Since these two functions hold for all the industries that home specializes, the
solution would be the same for all these industries within [0,z] under our assumption that fz, fzx
42This is a proof by contradiction. Suppose ∂ϕz∂ z > 0, so will ϕzx given
∂Λz
∂ z > 0. Then the left hand side of
Equation (3.16) will decrease with z. But the right hand side is a constant. Contradiction. Similar argument
applies if ∂ϕz∂ z = 0.
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and fez do not vary with z.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The conditional probability of export is given by χz =
1−G(ϕzx)
1−G(ϕz) . From Proposition 3, we know
that ∂ϕz∂ z < 0 and
∂ϕzx
∂ z > 0 for z ∈ (z, z). Thus we have
∂G(ϕz)
∂ z < 0 and
∂G(ϕzx)
∂ z > 0 as long as the
cumulative distribution function G(ϕ) is continuous and G(ϕ)′ > 0 . Then it is easy to see that
∂χz
∂ z < 0 for z ∈ (z, z). For z ∈ [0,z], we know that
∂ϕz
∂ z = 0 and
∂ϕzx
∂ z = 0 from Proposition 3, so
∂χz
∂ z = 0.
Under the assumption that G(ϕ) is Pareto distributed, we have χz =Λ−az and the Λz =
ϕzx
ϕz
=
ϕ̂zx
ϕ̂z
. Thus using the result that Λz = χ
1
σ−1
z
ϕ̂zx
ϕ̂z
( f RR∗ )
1
σ−1 from the proof of Proposition 3, we have
χz = R
∗
f R for industries that home specializes. For industries that both countries produce, we
know that χz = τ˜
−a f−εah(z)
εa f h(z)−τ˜a from the proof of Proposition 1. Using the chain rule, we have
∂χz
∂ z =
(1−τ˜−2a f 2)εah(z)a
(εa f h(z)−τ˜a)2 (ln(A)− σσ−1 ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )). Let B(z) =
(1−τ˜−2a f 2)εah(z)a
(εa f h(z)−τ˜a)2 which is positive,
immediately, we have
∂χz
∂ z
= B(z)(ln(A)− σ
σ −1 ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)),
whose sign depends only on ln(A) and σσ−1 ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ ).
43 For average export intensity for each
sector is γz≡ χzr(ϕ̂zx)r(ϕ̂z)+χzr(ϕ̂zx) =
χz fzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx
)σ−1σrzw1−z
( fz(
ϕ̂z
ϕz
)σ−1+χz fzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx
)σ−1)σrzw1−z
= fzxχzfz+ fzxχz =
f χz
1+ f χz , thus
∂γz
∂χz =
f
(1+ f χz)2
>
0. So γz is a monotonic increasing function of χz and should follow the same pattern as χz.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
From Equation (3.16) for free entry equation, we can calculate that the average of idiosyncratic
firm productivity as
ϕ̂z = (
a
a+1−σ )
1
σ−1ϕz = (
a
a+1−σ )
1
σ−1 [
(σ −1)θ a
(a+1−σ)δ f˜ (1+ f χz)]
1
a
43B(z) is positive as τ˜−a f < 1.
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where f˜ = fezfz . Let C = (
a
a+1−σ )
1
σ−1 [ (σ−1)θ
a
(a+1−σ)δ f˜ ]
1
a , we immediately have
ϕ̂z =C(1+ f χz)1/a.
From the equation above, ϕ̂z is monotonic increasing function of χz. As we have proved in
Proposition 4, χz is higher in industries with larger comparative advantage, so is ϕ̂z. Then
measured average productivity for each industry is
Â(z) = Eϕ{A(z)ϕ|ϕ > ϕz}= A(z)ϕ˜z
Thus the measured Ricardian comparative advantage is given by Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= A(z)A∗(z)
ϕ˜z
ϕ˜∗z
. Under our
assumption that A(z)A∗(z) = λA
z and using the expression for ϕ̂z above, we have
Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= λAz(
1+ f χz
1+ f χ∗z
)1/a,
which is the second result of the proposition. 
8.6 Welfare
Given the CES aggregation within each sector, the real consumption for each sector is Q(z) =
R(z)
P(z) , where R(z)=b(z)R is the sectoral revenue and P(z) is the price index of sector z. Hence the
welfare of the representative household is given by
U =
1∫
0
b(z) lnb(z)dz+ lnR−
1∫
0
b(z) lnP(z)dz,
where the first term is a constant intrinsic to the Cobb-Douglas preferences. The sectoral price
index P(z) is given by Equation (3.18). Plugging in the average price of domestic varieties
and average F.O.B price of foreign varieties respectively: Pz(ϕ̂z) = σσ−1
rzw1−z
A(z)ϕ̂z
and Pz(ϕ̂∗zx) =
54
σ
σ−1
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗ϕ̂∗zx
, we have
P(z) =
σ
σ −1
1
A(z)
[Mz(
rzw1−z
ϕ̂z
)1−σ +χ∗z M
∗
z (τ
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗
A(z) ϕ̂
∗
zx
)1−σ ]
1
1−σ .
where A(z)
∗
A(z) is estimated as the Ricardian Comparative Advantage λA
z. If we only care about
relative welfare, then for the case of no specialization (which is the case for our estimated
results):
U∗−U = ln R
∗
R
+
1∫
0
b(z) ln
P(z)
P(z)∗
dz
= ln
R∗
R
+
1∫
0
b(z)[ln
A(z)∗
A(z)
+
1
1−σ ln
Mz( r
zw1−z
ϕ̂z
)1−σ +χ∗z M∗z (τ r
∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗
A(z) ϕ̂
∗
zx
)1−σ
M∗z ( r
∗zw∗1−z
A(z)
A∗(z) ϕ̂
∗
z
)1−σ +χzMz(τ r
zw1−z
ϕ̂zx
)1−σ
]dz.
This can be computed with our baseline estimation result. However, if we want to know the
welfare change at home and foreign over time, we need to know A(z) and A(z)∗, the exogenous
sectoral level productivities which are not directly observed. However, we can first estimate the
average sectoral TFP: E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕz) = A(z)ϕ̂z while ϕ̂z can be computed from Proposition
5 as ϕ̂z =C(1+ f χz)1/a.44 Then an estimator of A(z) is:
A(z) =
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕz)
ϕ̂z
.
Then A(z)∗ is inferred as A(z)∗ = A(z)λAz . We note that
exp(U) = exp(
1∫
0
b(z) lnb(z)dz)
R
exp(
1∫
0
b(z) lnP(z)dz)
44The limitation that we face here is that we cannot identify C. We have to assume that it is constant over time.
Thus we cannot capture the welfare effect due to change in δ , θ or f˜ .
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is the real consumption, and the welfare change as measured by real consumption is given by:45
Û ≡ exp(U ′−U) = exp(ln R
′
R
−
1∫
0
b(z) ln
P(z)′
P(z)
dz)
=
R′
R
exp(
1∫
0
b(z)[ln(
A(z)′
A(z)
)− 1
1−σ ln
M′z( r
′zw′1−z
ϕ̂ ′z
)1−σ +χ∗′z M∗′z (τ ′ r
∗′zw∗′1−z
A(z)∗′
A(z)′ ϕ̂
∗′
zx
)1−σ
Mz( r
zw1−z
ϕ̂z
)1−σ +χ∗z M∗z (τ r
∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗
A(z) ϕ̂
∗
zx
)1−σ
]dz).
8.7 Robustness of the motivating evidence
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our motivating evidence that productivity
growth is faster in labor intensity industries, production becomes more capital intensive and
export participation increases for labor intensive industries but falls for capital intensive indus-
tries.
First, two alternative measures of productivity are used: labor productivity, and TFP esti-
mated by the Olley and Pakes (1996) method. The results are presented in Figure A1. Again,
productivity growth is relatively faster in labor intensive industries.
Figure A1: robustness by productivity growth
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Notes: Labor productivity is measured as real valued added per worker. TFP is estimated as in Olley-Pakes
(1996).
We then check whether our motivating evidence are driven by any institutional particular to
China. We examine the role of Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), State Owned Enterprise (SOE)
45Since we normalize L = 1, R would be income per capita in China. We divide R∗ by L∗ to normalize the
income to be a per capita measure as well whenever we compute the welfare for RoW.
56
and processing trade. Each time, we exclude firms subject to these institutions respectively and
regenerate our basic motivating graphs. The results are shown in Figure A2. They are qualita-
tively consistent with the evidence in the main text. Next, we check whether our findings are
driven by definition for industries. Instead of using the industry classification of ”HO aggre-
gate”, we use the four-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) to see whether our evidence
still hold. The results are presented Figure A3. The results are consistent with our evidence
using HO aggregate as industries classification.
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Notes: (a) Industry classification is ”HO aggregate” as in the main text. (b) The charts on MFA are produced
by excluding the textile industries: 2-digit CIC industries of 17 and 18. (b) The charts on SOE are by excluding
state owned firms. (c) The charts on Pure exporters are by excluding pure exporters, i.e., firms which export
more than 70% of the outputs.
Figure A2: robustness by excluding sub-samples
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Figure A3: Motivating evidence in CIC industry classfication
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9 Online Appendix (not for publication)
9.1 Basic Summary Statistics of the data
Table A.1: Statistical Summary of Main Variables
Variables mean in 1999 mean in 2007
revenue(U1,000) 50,932 117,888
value added(U1,000) 14,130 31,983
sales(U1,000) 49,306 115,413
export(U1,000) 8,932 24,052
employee 329 219
total profit(U1,000) 1,867 6,814
wage(U1,000) 3,383 5,429
Notes: We followed Brandt et al (2012) to only include manufacturing firms with more than 8 employees,
positive output and fixed assets, and drop firms with capital intensities less than zero or greater than one. We
are left with 116,905 and 290,382 firms in 1999 and 2007 which represent about 80% and 93% of the original
sample, respectively.
9.2 Additional Figures on Parametrization
The structural relationship γz = f χz1+ f χz is used to estimate the relative fixed costs of export
f ≡ fzxfz . Using the observe γz and χz, f is estimated by sector using f =
γz
χz(1−γz) . The re-
sult is plotted in Figure A4 (a). The expenditure share b(z) is computed as the average of
consumption share during 2000-2006. A ratio of aggregate imports to exports is estimated for
the matched firms using the firm survey and the Customs Data. Imports of each industry is
estimated as aggregate exports of all the firms in the survey multiplied by the ratio. Once im-
ports are estimated, consumption is simply outputs plus imports minus exports. To infer the
expenditure function across the whole support [0,1] as a continuous functions, we interpolate
the expenditure function by linear projection. The result is shown in Figure A4 (b).
To infer export propensity for RoW, we use the result that χ∗z = χ−1z
(
τ f
1
σ−1
)−2a
, where χz
is directly observable from the data; a = 3.43 and σ = 3.66 are calibrated; f = 1 for year 1999
and f = 1.77 for year 2007 are estimated above; τ =2.38 for year 1999 and τ =1.76 for year
2007 from the structural estimation. The results are plotted in Figure A5.
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Table A.2: Capital Share of Exporters and Non-Exporters in 2007
2-digit industry code description
capital share of non-exporters capital share of exporters
mean std mean std
13 Processing of Foods 0.83 0.18 0.76 0.21
14 Manufacturing of Foods 0.76 0.20 0.71 0.22
15 Manufacture of Beverages 0.80 0.18 0.78 0.17
16 Manufacture of Tobacco 0.74 0.19 0.90 0.11
17 Manufacture of Textile 0.72 0.20 0.63 0.22
18 Manufacture of Apparel, Footwear & Caps 0.60 0.24 0.51 0.24
19 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, & Feather 0.64 0.25 0.53 0.23
20 Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm & Straw Products 0.74 0.20 0.69 0.21
21 Manufacture of Furniture 0.69 0.23 0.56 0.23
22 Manufacture of Paper & Paper Products 0.73 0.19 0.65 0.22
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 0.67 0.21 0.59 0.22
24 Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education & Sport Activities 0.64 0.23 0.54 0.23
25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, &Fuel 0.85 0.16 0.78 0.20
26 Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials 0.79 0.19 0.75 0.19
27 Manufacture of Medicines 0.78 0.19 0.74 0.19
28 Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 0.80 0.17 0.77 0.20
29 Manufacture of Rubber 0.73 0.21 0.61 0.23
30 Manufacture of Plastics 0.72 0.21 0.60 0.23
31 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral goods 0.74 0.20 0.63 0.22
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.82 0.17 0.82 0.15
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.82 0.18 0.78 0.19
34 Manufacture of Metal Products 0.71 0.21 0.61 0.21
35 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 0.72 0.20 0.65 0.20
36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 0.72 0.21 0.63 0.21
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.70 0.21 0.65 0.21
39 Electrical Machinery & Equipment 0.73 0.21 0.61 0.23
40 Computers & Other Electronic Equipment 0.65 0.23 0.58 0.25
41 Manufacture of Measuring Instruments & Machinery for Cultural Activity & Office Work 0.69 0.22 0.56 0.23
42 Manufacture of Artwork 0.66 0.23 0.57 0.24
All Industries 0.74 0.21 0.62 0.23
Notes: This table is generated using the Chinese firm survey for year 2007.
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9.3 CES preferences
Instead of assuming an aggregate Cobb-Douglas utility function, we assume that
U = (
∫ 1
0
Q(z)µdz)1/µ
Q(z) = [
∫
ϖ∈Ωz
qz(ϖ)ρdϖ ]1/ρ
where U is the upper-tier utility function and Q(z) is the lower-tier utility function and µ ∈
(0,1],ρ ∈ (0,1]. Then the elasticity of substitution between different industry and within each
industry η = 11−µ > 1 and σ =
1
1−ρ > 1. Then the demand for each industry and each variety
are given by
Q(z) = Q(
P(z)
P
)−η (9.7)
qz(ϖ) = Q(z)(
pz(ϖ)
P(z)
)−σ
where P and P(z) are pricing indexes. The revenues from domestic and foreign market are:
rzd(ϕ) = R(
P(z)
P
)1−η(
pz(ϕ)
P(z)
)1−σ = RPη−1P(z)σ−η pz(ϕ)1−σ
rzx(ϕ) = R∗P∗η−1P∗(z)σ−η pzx(ϕ)1−σ
The profits from domestic and foreign sales are
pizd(ϕ) =
rzd(ϕ)
σ
− fzrzw1−z
pizx(ϕ) =
rzx(ϕ)
σ
− fzxrzw1−z
Using the zero-profit condition, we find Λz ≡ ϕzxϕz , the ratio between the cut-off productivity of
export and survival is
Λz = τ(
fzxR
fzR∗
)
1
σ−1 (
P∗
P
)
1−η
σ−1 (
P(z)
P(z)∗
)
σ−η
σ−1
where P = [
∫ 1
0 P(z)
1−ηdz]
1
1−η is the aggregate pricing index (P* for foreign). If η = 1, we are
back to the Cobb-Douglas world. Using the equation above, we can prove that our propositions
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still hold. Especially, under the assumption of Pareto Distribution, the conditional probability
of exporting is given by
χz =

[
τη−1 f RR∗ (
P
P∗ )
η−1
] a(σ−1)
(1−η)(σ−1)−a(σ−η) z ∈ [0,z]
τ˜−a f−εag(z)
εa f g(z)−τ˜a z ∈ (z,z)
9.4 Estimation Algorithm
For a given set of the exogenous parameters {K∗K , L
∗
L ,
K
L ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ , b(z)}, we follow the idea
of the proof for Proposition 1 to solve the endogenous factor prices {w, w∗, r, r∗} using the factor
market clearing conditions. First, the aggregate revenue for home and foreign are: R=wL+rK
and R∗ = w∗L∗+ r∗K∗. The factor intensity cut-offs are: z =
ln(
χz τ˜a+ f τ˜−a
1+ f χz )− aσ1−σ ln( ww∗ )−a ln(λ )
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )+a ln(A)
and
z =
ln( χz τ˜
a+ f τ˜−a
1+ f χz
)− aσ1−σ ln( ww∗ )−a ln(λ )
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )+a ln(A)
, where χz = R
∗
f R and χz =
R∗
f R(
f
τ˜a )
2. The factor market clearing
conditions for home country are
z∫
0
(1− z)b(z)(R+R
∗)
w
dz+
z∫
z
(1− z)Rz
w
= L,
z∫
0
z
b(z)(R+R∗)
r
dz+
z∫
z
z
Rz
r
= K.
where Rz is given by equation (8.4). There are two similar equations for the foreign. So we
have four equations to solve for the four unknown factor prices {w, w∗, r, r∗}.
Once {w, w∗, r, r∗} are known, we compute domestic and foreign aggregate revenues R and
R∗, the probability of export for each industry χz and the share of firms for each industry. This
is done without the need to know other parameters of the model: fz, fzx, fez,δ and θ , which is
shown in Appendix 9.5.
Then we compute our target moments R
∗
R , exporter share for z ≥ 0.5 and z ≤ 0.5, capital
intensity of all firms and capital intensity for all exporters. Our estimation takes {L∗L , f ,a,σ ,
b(z)} as given and search for {K∗K , KL ,A,λ ,τ } to match these moments. In essence, there are
basically two loops: an inter loop solving the factor prices and compute the model the moments,
and an outer loop to search for model parameters that match the moments.
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9.5 Identification
We first prove that given b(z), χz and R
∗
R only depend on {K
∗
K ,
L∗
L ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ}. Then we prove
that firm mass distribution mz depends on {K∗K , L
∗
L ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ} and KL . Starting from factor
market clearing condition, for sectors that are specialized by either country, we have
Ls =
z∫
0
l(z)dz =
R+R∗
w
z∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz = R+R
∗
w
N,
Ks =
z∫
0
k(z)dz =
R+R∗
r
z∫
0
zb(z)dz =
R+R∗
r
B,
L∗s =
1∫
z
l∗(z)dz =
R+R∗
w∗
1∫
z
(1− z)b(z)dz = R+R
∗
w∗
C,
K∗s =
1∫
z
k∗(z)dz =
R+R∗
r∗
1∫
z
zb(z)dz =
R+R∗
r∗
D,
where N ≡
z∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz,B≡
z∫
0
zb(z)dz,C ≡
1∫
z
(1− z)b(z)dz and D≡
1∫
z
zb(z)dz.
For sectors that are produced by both countries, we have:
Lint =
1
w
z∫
z
b(z)(1− z)[ R
1− τ˜−aεa f h(z) −
f R∗
τ˜aεah(z)− f ]dz =
R
w
E− R
∗
w
F,
Kint =
1
r
z∫
z
b(z)z[
R
1− τ˜−aεa f h(z) −
f R∗
τ˜aεah(z)− f ]dz =
R
r
G− R
∗
r
H,
L∗int =
1
w∗
z∫
z
b(z)(1− z)εah(z)[ R
∗
εah(z)− f τ˜−a −
f R
τ˜a− εa f h(z)]dz =
R∗
w∗
I− R
w∗
J,
K∗int =
1
r∗
z∫
z
b(z)zεah(z)[
R∗
εah(z)− f τ˜−a −
f R
τ˜a− εa f h(z)]dz =
R∗
r∗
X− R
r∗
Y,
where E ≡
z∫
z
b(z)(1−z)
1−τ˜−aεa f h(z)dz, F ≡
z∫
z
f b(z)(1−z)
τ˜aεah(z)− f dz,G≡
z∫
z
b(z)z
1−τ˜−aεa f h(z)dz,H ≡
z∫
z
f b(z)z
τ˜aεah(z)− f dz, I ≡
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z∫
z
b(z)(1−z)εah(z)
εah(z)− f τ˜−a dz,J ≡
z∫
z
f b(z)(1−z)εah(z)
τ˜a−εa f h(z) dz,X ≡
z∫
z
b(z)zεah(z)
εah(z)− f τ˜−a dz and Y ≡
z∫
z
f b(z)zεah(z)
τ˜a−εa f h(z) dz. Using
factor market clearing condition,
Ls+Lint = L,Ks+Kint = K
L∗s +L
∗
int = L
∗,K∗s +K
∗
int = K
∗
We have
L =
R
w
(N+E)+
R∗
w
(N−F),K = R
r
(B+G)+
R∗
r
(B−H)
L∗ =
R
w∗
(C− J)+ R
∗
w∗
(C+ I),K∗ =
R
r∗
(D−Y )+ R
∗
r∗
(D+X)
Moreover, given R = wL+ rK and R∗ = w∗L∗+ r∗K∗,we have
R∗
R
=
1−N−E−B−G
N−F +B−H =
C+D− J−Y
1−C−D−X− I .
Since N, B, C,..., I, J, X and Y only depend on { r∗r , w
∗
w ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ}46, according to the
equation above, R
∗
R also depends on { r
∗
r ,
w∗
w ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ} only.
Moreover,
L∗
L
=
w
w∗
C− J+(C+ I)R∗R
N+E +(N−F)R∗R
K∗
K
=
r
r∗
(D−Y )+(D+X)R∗R
B+G+(B−H)R∗R
Then given {A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ}, there is an one to one mapping between {K∗K , L
∗
L } and { r
∗
r ,
w∗
w }.
So χz =
 R
∗
f R z ∈ [0,z]
τ˜−a f−εah(z)
εa f h(z)−τ˜a z ∈ (z,z)
depends on {K∗K , L
∗
L ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ} only.
Next, we prove that firm mass distribution mz depends on {K∗K , L
∗
L ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ} and KL .
46Given b(z), N, B, C, ..., I, J, X and Y are integrals of function of εah(z) defined over a intersection given by 0,
z, z and 1. εah(z), z and z are functions of { r∗r , w
∗
w Ψ,λ ,a,f,τ ,σ} only.
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We define the firm mass distribution as
mz =
Mz∫ z
0 Mzdz
For industries that home country specializes
b(z)(R+R∗) = Mzr(ϕ˜z)
= Mz
aσ fzrzw1−z(1+ f χz)
a+1−σ
Thus
Mz(
r
w
)z =
b(z)(R+R∗)
aσ fzw
a+1−σ (1+ f χz)
= b(z)L
(1+ rKwL)(1+
R∗
R )
aσ fz
a+1−σ (1+ f χz)
Similarly, for industries that both countries produces:
Mz =
b(z)L(1+ rKwL)(1+
R∗
R )
aσ fz
a+1−σ (1+ f χz)(1+
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z )
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)( rw)
z
Then, according to the definition of m(z), we have
mz =
Mz∫ z
0 Mzdz
=
b(z)L (1+
rK
wL )(1+
R∗
R )
aσ fz
a+1−σ (
r
w )
z(1+ f χz)∫ z
0 b(z)L
(1+ rKwL )(1+
R∗
R )
aσ fz
a+1−σ (1+ f χz)(
r
w )
z
dz+
∫ z
z
b(z)L(1+ rKwL )(1+
R∗
R )
aσ fz
a+1−σ (1+ f χz)(1+
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z )
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)( rw )
z
dz
= b(z)
( rw)
−z(1+ f χz)−1∫ z
0 b(z)(
r
w)
−z(1+ f χz)−1dz+
∫ z
z
b(z)( rw )
−z
(1+M
∗z r(ϕ˜∗z )
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)(1+ f χz)
dz
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for the industries that home specializes. As for industries that both countries produce:
mz =
Mz∫ z
0 Mzdz
= b(z)
( rw )
−z
(1+M
∗z r(ϕ˜∗z )
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)(1+ f χz)∫ z
0 b(z)(
r
w)
−z(1+ f χz)−1dz+
∫ z
z
b(z)( rw )
−z
(1+M
∗z r(ϕ˜∗z )
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)(1+ f χz)
dz
It is obvious that mz depends on rw which is determined by
r
w
=
L
K
R(B+G)+R∗(B−H)
R(N+E)+R∗(N−F)
=
L
K
(B+G)+ R
∗
R (B−H)
(N+E)+ R
∗
R (N−F)
Thus rw depends not only on {K
∗
K ,
L∗
L ,A,λ ,a, f ,τ,σ} but also KL . So does mz.
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